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Introduction
The twentieth century was marked by global
evolution in favor of economic liberalism combined with a
steady decline in economic nationalism and Marxist
economics.1 Foreign Direct Investment’s (FDI) potential to
serve as a significant tool for many states to achieve
ambitious economic progress has consequently led to a
dynamic development of,2 and reformation in, the regime of
See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment
Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 621 (1998) [hereinafter Vandevelde, Political
Economy], (describing the propagation and economically liberalizing goals of
bilateral investment treaties, or “BITs,” and explaining the terms “economic
nationalism,” “economic liberalism,” and “Marxist economics,” which this
paper extensively uses).
2
Following the categorization of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD”), this paper categorizes “states” according to their
development and economic status in three broad categories, namely: developed
states, developing states, and transition states. Untill 2020, the UNCTAD had
categorized transition economies separately, but has stopped since 2021.
However, for the purpose of this paper, the classification of transition
economies has been used for the statistics available until 2020. See U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development, Development Status Groups and
1
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International Investment Agreements (IIAs)3 and the rise of
the novel jurisprudence of Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS). 4 Data available from UNCTAD shows the global
FDI inflow calculated in 1970 at $13,257 million and global
FDI outflow at $14,141 million had phenomenally expanded
to $1,530,228 million and $1,220,432 million respectively
by 2019.5 With FDI considered an essential ingredient for
economic development, states must formulate policies to
attract and boost confidence in foreign investors and

Composition, (May 28, 2020) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Development Status],
https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Classifications/DimCountries_DevelopmentS
tatus_Hierarchy.pdf.
3
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, International Investment
Agreements Navigator: Investor Policy Hub, at Tereminology
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/ (last
visited Jan. 10, 2020) [hereinafter UNCTAD] (defining “international
investment agreements (IIAs)” to include all “bilateral investment treaties
(BITs)” and “treaties with investment provisions (TIPs)”; noting a large
majority of IIAs comprises BITs; further noting whereas UNCTAD has defined
BITs as “agreement[s] between two countries regarding promotion and
protection of investments made by investors from respective countries in each
other’s territory,” TIPs comprise “various types of investment treaties that are
not BITs” and that are mainly of three types: “1. broad economic treaties that
include obligations commonly found in BITs (e.g., a free trade agreement with
an investment chapter); 2. treaties with limited investment-related provisions
(e.g., only those concerning establishment of investments or free transfer of
investment-related funds); and 3. treaties that only contain ‘framework’ clauses
such as the ones on cooperation in the area of investment and/or for a mandate
for future negotiations on investment issues.”).
4
See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. (“UNCITRAL”), Possible Reform of
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Submission from the Secretariate to
Working Group III, at 8-9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149 (Sept. 5, 2018)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149].
5
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development STAT, Foreign Direct
Investment: Inward and Outward Flows and Stock, Annual [hereinafter
UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment],
https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=967
40 (last visited Feb. 17, 2022). The measurement used by UNCTAD for FDI
inward flow and outward flow is “US dollars at current prices in millions.” Id.
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simultaneously protect their national interest and
sovereignty as host states.6
IIAs have arguably emerged as the most prominent
weapon used by states to attract FDI through foreign
investors.
These treaties are instruments of public
international law, and states specifically design them to
enhance foreign investors’ confidence in the stability of the
investment environment by providing substantive
guarantees as enforceable obligations upon host states.7
These treaties often have provisions for dispute
settlement between foreign investors and host states.8 Such
mechanisms prescribed by IIAs for investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) are a significant break from the traditional
mechanism of diplomatic protections, and allow foreign
investors to make claims directly against host states. 9
Currently, such ISDS mechanisms usually involve what may
be termed investment treaty arbitrations (ITA), characterized
by a dispute being adjudicated by ad hoc arbitral tribunals
established to adjudicate specific disputes.10
Since the first IIA was signed in 1957, as many as
3,238 IIAs have been signed until January 2022, including
2,815 BITs and 423 TIPs,11 whereas a total of 1,104 known
treaty-based ISDS proceedings have been initiated. 12 As
economies become increasingly dependent on FDI, many
stakeholders of the present international investment regime
See generally COMM. ON INT’L & MULTINAT’L ENTERS., FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMISING BENEFITS, MINIMISING COSTS,
(Org. Econ. Coop. & Dev., 2002) [hereinafter CIME],
https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf.
7
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, supra note 4.
8
See id.
9
U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 3–4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/917 (Apr. 20, 2017)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/917].
10
Id.
11
See UNCTAD, supra note 3.
12
UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, Investment Policy Hub
[hereinafter UNCTAD, Navigator],
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement (last visited
Feb. 17, 2022).
6
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are concerned about the complexities and increasing amount
of ISDS foreign investors are initiating. 13 `States are
concerned with the rising amount of ISDS being initiated
against them whereas investors are concerned with rigid and
restrictive FDI policies and IIAs. 14 Such concerns have
accumulated in the past few years on the global stage and
have led to a call for revaluation and reformation of the ISDS
regime and consequently in FDI policies and the IIA
regime.15
Although this relatively new international
investment regime has achieved phenomenal global
expansion and the participation of a majority of states, it was
still evolving when the COVID-19 pandemic suddenly
disrupted the global economy, which has further fueled
uncertainty and now warrants a completely new approach for
revaluation and reformation of the regime. 16 Like other
treaties, specific IIAs have been concluded subject to
contextual historical, social, and political developments. 17
Changes in the sociopolitical and economic environment
work as catalysts for the development of the international
investment regime. 18 The development of IIAs depends
U.N. GAOR, supra note 9, at 4.
See, e.g., Lars N. Skovgaard Poulsen & Geoffrey Gertz, Reforming the
Investment Treat Regime: A “Backward-Looking” Approach, BROOKINGS INST.
(Mar.
17,
2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/reforming-theinvestment-treaty-regime/ (describing investor–state tensions).
15
Rep. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., 50th Sess., at 43-47, U.N. Doc. A/72/17
(July 3–21, 2017).
16
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, International Investment
Agreements
Reform
Accelerator,
2–3
(2020),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaepcbinf2020d8_en.pdf.
See also U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2020, at 2–10 (2020) [hereinafter UNCTAD, World 2020],
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2020_en.pdf.
17
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2015, at 121–25 (2015) [hereinafter UNCTAD, World 2015],
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/wir2015_en.pdf.
18
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Inv. Pol’y Framework for
Sustainable Dev., 13 (2015) [hereinafter UNCTAD, IPFSD],
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf.
13
14
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upon attracting FDI and maintaining its flow. Considering
the current role of FDI in the global economy, it has become
important to understand the dynamic evolution that has led
to the present-day IIA and ISDS regime. It has thus become
imperative to analyze this regime’s dynamic development
from a sociopolitical and economic perspective and consider
the necessity of any suitable reforms considering the
projected future and relevant objectives.
A.
History and Development of the
Current Regime
“International investment agreements (IIAs)—like
most other treaties—are a product of the time when they are
negotiated.”19
Even though trade and commercial practices have
been prevalent, developing, and restructuring for a
considerable amount of time, the effect of these practices on
economic development was quite limited but grew steadily
with major changes implemented in the twentieth century
with an aim to develop a more sustainable global economy.20
Evidently, the origin of the present international investment
regime lies in the second half of the twentieth century, but
its earliest conceptualization can be traced back to the
eighteenth century with bilateral treaties of “Friendship,
Commerce[,] and Navigation” between states to establish
commercial relations.21 These treaties included provisions
that protect property of nationals of other contracting states,
compensation for expropriation, and rights to engage in
certain business activities.22 It is pertinent to note that until
the first half of the twentieth century, customary
international law (CIL) was the principle source of
UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 16, at 121.
See id. at 121–25.
21
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157, 158 (2005) [hereinafter
Vandevalde, Brief History].
22
Id. at 158–59.
19
20
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international legal rules governing foreign investments. 23
This caused major differences of opinion amongst states
regarding standards of treatment, and provided impractical
remedies for disputes ranging from espousal to military
force.24
However, by the turn of the twentieth century, the
world experienced an unsettling blend of industrialism,
colonialism, and domestic economic inequality that resulted
in a dangerous combination that had already achieved its
peak and was looking forward to its inevitable downfall.25
The global mass was dissatisfied with the socioeconomic
structure passed down from the nineteenth century and still
characterized by powerful states having industrial
economies dependent on the exploitation of natural and
human resources of either their colonies or the vast natural
and human resources held by them, combined with many
states still being led by ancient monarchies and
concentration of power and wealth among a select few
leading to a vast economic disparity.26 The economies were
largely based on a capitalist structure, but many people were
eager to reorganize under the new economic and political
concepts of socialism and communism, aiming to create
more equal societies addressing the issues created by
capitalism.27 Although the voice of dissent was the loudest
in the colonies, which had for multiple centuries experienced
Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 159–161.
25
See Branko Milanovic, Inequality, Imperialism, and the First World War,
PROMARKET (Jan. 3, 2018), https://promarket.org/2018/01/03/inequalityimperialism-first-world-war/; see also A. P. Thornton, Colonialism, 17 INT'L J.
335, 335–357 (1962); Carl Strikwerda, World War I in the History of
Globalization, 42 HIST. REFLECTIONS/RÉFLEXIONS HISTORIQUES 112 (2016).
26
Strikwerda, supra note 25, at 112.
27
See Thornton, supra note 25, at 349–50; see also William Henry Chamberlin,
Making the Collective Man in Soviet Russia, in How We Got Here: The Rise of
the Modern Order, 49 FOREIGN AFFS. 7, 14–16 (2012); Gideon Rose, Making
Modernity Work: The Reconciliation of Capitalism and Democracy, 91
FOREIGN AFFS. 3, 3–6 (2012). See generally MICHAEL REIMAN, ABOUT
RUSSIA, ITS REVOLUTIONS, ITS DEVELOPMENT AND ITS PRESENT (2016).
23
24
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exploitation of human and natural resources by their
powerful colonizers, dissent was also heard from within the
powerful states resulting from the ever-growing economic
disparity and concentration of power among a few
individuals.28 As dissatisfaction peaked, the first half of the
twentieth century was marked by a rise in global turmoil
characterized by two world wars, the Great Depression,
numerous political upheavals, vast economic inequality,
civil wars, and most importantly, the decolonization leading
to the birth of several new states.29
After the turmoil of the first half of the twentieth
century was settled, the world found itself in the midst of
war-torn economies and newly formed states after the steady
and long overdue process of decolonization.30 Although the
world was eager to mutually grow with a stable international
economic cooperation, the challenges were far from over.
The conflicts among the states following the principles of
economic liberalism, which favored a free capitalist market,
economic nationalism, which believed in aligning the
economic policy to serve its political policy, and economic
Marxism, following principles of communism and a critique
of liberalism, divided the global economy.31
Many states still reviving from the turmoil of the
first half of twentieth century or centuries of exploitation
over the hands of their colonizers, tilted more towards
socialistic or communist principles with elements of

See generally Milanovic, supra note 25; Thornton, supra note 25; Strikwerda,
supra note 25; Chamberlin, supra note 27; Rose, supra note 27.
29
See generally Milanovic, supra note 25; Thornton, supra note 25; Strikwerda,
supra note 25; Chamberlin, supra note 27; Rose, supra note 27.
30
Off. Historian, Decolonization of Asia and Africa, 1945–1960, U.S. DEP’T
STATE,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/asia-andafrica#:~:text=Between%201945%20and%201960%2C%20three,from%20the
ir%20European%20colonial%20rulers.&text=Decolonization%20was%20ofte
n%20affected%20by,the%20evolution%20of%20that%20competition
(last
visited Feb. 15, 2022).
31
See Vandevelde, Political Economy, supra note 1.
28
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Autarky. 32 Problems were far worse for the newly
independent states which still had visible countless scars left
by their former colonizers, combined with a baseless
poverty-stricken domestic economy and infested with
illiteracy and lack of finances which had only served the
purposes of their former colonizers.33 It was clear that their
fight for the top would start from the very bottom. Being
colonized and ruled for several years, their definition of
development was inspired by the very portrayal of their
colonizers who had continuously exploited them for years.34
The new underdeveloped states of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America prioritized promoting economic nationalism
by developing their domestic economies through restricting
outward investment and protecting and developing
economic resources available to their states.35 On the other
hand, with the end of World War II and emergence of the
victorious USSR, the spread of communist political and
economic ideas–the hardline critique of economic liberalist
ideas–became inevitable. 36 The neo-Marxists of the
twentieth century developed the dependency theory of
foreign investment which regarded foreign investment as
“neocolonialism” because it subjects local economies to
foreign control and promotes their underdevelopment. 37
This theory favored state interference in the economy to
more equally distribute wealth and screen out the foreign
investment if they were found not to contribute in state’s

See, e.g., Thornton, supra note 25, at 336-37. See also Leon Trotsky,
Nationalism and Economic Life, in How We Got Here, supra note 27, at 32-34;
Philip E. Mosely, Communist Policy and the Third World, 28 REV. POLITICS
210 (1966).
33
See Thornton, supra note 25, at 342–43.
34
Matthew D. Fails & Jonathan Krieckhaus, Colonialism, Property Rights and
the Modern World Income Distribution, 40 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 487–508 (2010).
35
See Vandevelde, Political Economy, supra note 1, at 622–23.
36
Id.
37
See id.
32
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developmental objective and, in some cases, expropriating
the foreign investment.38
Multiple states in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and
Latin America—who were facing poverty and economic
disparity, and either still overcoming colonialism’s effects or
ravaged by World War II—believed communism was the
best socio-political and economic policy. 39 This made
achieving a stable international cooperative global economy
impossible. Yet, the second half of the twentieth century
(beginning after World War II) oversaw dynamic changes in
the development of the present regime of international legal
rules governing foreign investments.40 Development of the
present international investment regime from 1945 to
present can be divided into the following six broad
categories:
1. Era of Institutional
Conceptualization (1945–1950)
Even though this postwar period is not marked by
any significant FDI flow, it played an important role in
introducing various structural- and institutional-based
reforms that set the ball rolling for the present international
investment regime and a dynamic global economy.41 As the
end of World War II was in sight, the Allied states started
establishing the new postwar international monetary and
economic order to preserve global economic prosperity and
peace by focusing on two critical aspects of expanding
international trade and creating a functioning global

Id.
See id. See also Mosely, supra note 32, at § 3.
40
Samuel K. B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A
Reappraisal, 37 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 588, 588–89 (1988).
41
See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic and Social
Survey 2017, U.N. (July 13, 2017) [hereinafter “Survey 2017”],
https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/wess-2017.html. See also
Henry Morgenthau Jr., Bretton Woods and International Cooperation, 23
FOREIGN AFF. 182–94 (1945); UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17 at 121–
25.
38
39
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monitory system. 42 The Bretton Woods Conference,
attended by delegates of 44 states in 1944, established the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, which proved to be a
big step because it provided collaboration and consultation
on international investment and monetary issues.43
Soon thereafter, to supplement its other building
stones like the Bretton Woods Institutions (1944), the United
Nations (1945), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (1947), an ambitious United Nations Conference for
Trade and Employment drew up the Havana Charter on
March 24, 1948, to promote the expansion of the production,
exchange, and consumption of goods and for the formation
of the International Trade Organization (ITO).44 Fifty-three
nations signed the charter and agreed to cooperate with one
another and with the United Nations in the “fields of trade
and employment and to create conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations.”45 Interestingly, chapter VIII of the
Havana Charter also prescribes for settlement of disputes for
the members like consultation and arbitration and references
the executive board of the ITO, the ITO conference, and the
International Court of Justice that was formulated under
Chapter XIV of the UN Charter signed on June 26, 1945.46
The Havana Charter was the first attempt at multilateral
investment rules, but with the absence of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) and the majority of the

See Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic and Social
Survey 2017, U.N. (July 13, 2017),
https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/wess-2017.html. See also
Morgenthau, supra note 41; UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 121–25.
43
See Morgenthau, supra note at 41.
44
U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related
Documents, 5, E/CONF.2/78 (Mar. 24, 1948) [hereinafter UNCTE,
E/CONF.2/78].
45
Id. at 5–7, 14.
46
Id. at 88–90; U.N. Charter art. 92.
42
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communist rule states. 47 It also demonstrated the split
between the market economies following economic
liberalism (that recognized private property) and the states
following communism or Marxist Economies (that did not
recognize private property).48 With respect to investment
negotiations, the developed, developing, and socialist states
could not agree on the interpretation of customary
international law and the content of an international
minimum standard of treatment of foreign investors.49
However, the Charter could never be implemented
because the member states did not deposit the instrument of
acceptance with the U.N. secretary general within Article
104 of the Charter’s prescribed time limit. 50 The Havana
Charter was an ambitious attempt, which could have
established a strong base of the Global Trade and
International Investment at the initial stage, that
consequently leading to economic development in the
postwar era (considering the Charter’s exceptions to free
trade rule, which favored the poor new states, the ITO might
have been a more attractive organization for the
underdeveloped states to join and would also have helped to
address the global inequalities).51
Even though the ambitious Havana Charter was
unenforceable, it successfully established the intent of the
states to establish and structure a stable, multilateral, open,
and liberal world economy, away from the policies of

UNCTE, E/CONF.2/78, supra note 44, at 5–7 (signatories to the charter
includes Czechoslovakia where the Communist Party seized power after the
coup in February 1948).
48
UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 122. See also Vandevelde,
Political Economy, supra note 1.
49
UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 122.
50
UNCTE, E/CONF.2/78, supra note 44, at 95.
51
See Richard Toye, Developing Multilateralism: The Havana Charter and the
Fight for the International Trade Organization, 1947–1948, 25 INT’L HIST.
REV. 282 (2003).
47
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autarky.52 Another landmark development in promotion of
international trade at a global level came with the signing of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), which
focused on reduction of trade barriers and tariffs and
eliminating the discrimination in international commerce.53
2. Era of Evolution (1951–1964)
The era of the institutional conceptualization’s
materialization was characterized by redevelopment of the
war-torn economies along with addressing the issues of
poverty and underdevelopment of the new independent
states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.54 In 1952, as the
new economic order started taking its shape, United
Kingdom v. Iran exposed significant limitations to the
protections afforded to foreign investors by a host state
under Customary International Law (CIL), which
consequently pushed for reformation towards IIAs and led
selective IIAs being concluded between states as the new
instruments for achieving the global economy’s objective.55
The 1957 Treaty of Rome was the first TIP which
established the European Economic Community and
provided the freedom of establishment and free movement
of capital as European Integration’s core pillars. 56 Soon
thereafter, in 1959, the first BIT was signed between
Germany and Pakistan. 57 The establishment of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), its Code on Capital Movements and Code on
Current Invisible Operations of 1961 (which promoted
liberalization of international trade in goods and services
See William Diebold, Reflections on the International Trade Organization,
14 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 335 (1994).
53
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
54
See Survey 2017, supra note 41, at 49–70.
55
See Anglo Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Judgement on preliminary objection
on jurisdiction, 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22, 1952); see also UNCTAD, World 2015,
supra note 17, at 121–22.
56
See UNCTAD, supra note 3.
57
Id.
52
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along with the progressive freedom of capital movements)
were additional significant developments in this era which
focused on economic liberalization.58
During the era’s progression, a total of thirty-six
IIAs were signed, including thirty-three BITs and three
TIPs.59 Although these early IIAs afforded foreign investors
weak protection afforded by a host state, they focused on
protection against expropriation and nationalization, which
were perceived as the main risks for investors from
developed countries investing in developing countries. 60
Despite relatively few investment protections and lack of
ISDS provisions these IIAs, and specifically the BITs,
emerged as the new types of instruments signed between a
developed and developing state.61
Further developments during this era include the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, also known as The New York Convention
(1958), which focused on the recognition and enforcement
of foreign arbitral award; 62 United Nations Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, arguably
the most important development towards strengthening the
sovereignty of the state and investor’s responsibilities,
recognized the people and state’s rights to permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources and
focused on their economic independence to exercise their
right in the interest of national development.63
3. Era of Contradiction (1965–1989)
With the constant change in the global economy and
the states’ socio-political structure along with the developing
OECD, OECD Codes of Liberalisation: User’s Guide (2019),
www.oecd.org/investment/codes.htm.
59
See UNCTAD, supra note 3.
60
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 122.
61
See id. at 121.
62
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21.3 U.S.T. 2517.
63
G.A. Res. 1803, (Dec. 14, 1962).
58
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states’ ambition to achieve the aims of development in
consonance with their political objectives, multiple states
started realizing the significance and contribution of FDI for
economic development strategies. 64
However, the
differences between the economic and political ideologies
still prevailed during this period. The Marxist economies,
led by the Soviet Union and many other developing states,
which followed economic nationalism principles—still
suspicious of foreign investments—continued to stay away
from the liberal IIA regime.65
Events like the foreign oil companies’
nationalization by Libya’s government in 1974, which,
without warning, revised the concession’s deeds entered into
with foreign oil companies, shocked developed countries’
foreign investors, and prominently highlighted the threat of
foreign-investment nationalization and expropriation by
developing states which were motivated by a conflict arising
out of socio political ideologies against economic liberalism
and neocolonialism, and which focused on the significance
of the protections granted under the new instruments of
IIAs. 66 Accordingly, significant development in the IIA
regime was observed in this era with better protection
afforded by the host state to foreign investors through
increasing the inclusion of ISDS provisions.67 The earliest
known inclusion of ISDS provisions in a BIT was between
Indonesia and Netherlands in 1968 as well as the earliest
publicly known example of a treaty based ISDS case—i.e.,
APPL v. Sri Lanka initiated in 1987 under the Sri LankaUnited Kingdom BIT (1980)—both marked this era.68

See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
Id.
66
Robert B. von Mehren & P. Nicholas Kourides, International Arbitrations
Between States and Foreign Private Parties: The Libyan Nationalization Cases,
75 AM. J. INT’L L. 476 (1981).
67
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
68
See id. See also UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
64
65
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The later part of this era was also marked by the
decline of economic Marxism with the Marxist economies’
majority showing signs of instability caused by domestic
socio-political and economical tensions which would
eventually lead to liberal economic reforms amongst them.69
Still, for the majority of this era, states like the Soviet Union,
China, India, Brazil, and many other Asian and Eastern
European States, preferred to stay away from the liberal
economic reforms or joined the IIA regime at a later stage of
this era.70
Among these states, China was the first communist
state to introduce liberal economic reforms to attract FDI in
1978.71 The heavy disruption and destruction in economic
development caused by the cultural revolution in China
(1966-1976) brought a long-term economic depression and
a reduction in standard of living. 72 This economic and
political fallout created a solid base for the move away from
its traditional and orthodox approach. 73 Recognizing the
importance and urgent requirement for Foreign Investment
to re-stabilize and develop the economy in 1978 led to the
introduction of reforms for economic liberalization in China
to attract foreign investors—referred to as “Open Door
Policy”—and further led to their first BIT with Sweden
being signed in 1982.74
This era was also marked by successful global
attempts to develop, institutionalize, and systematize
international trade resulting in significant resolutions,
conferences, and organizations. 75 With regard to foreign
investor and host state resolutions, a significant development
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17. See also Vandevelde, Political
Economy, supra note 1.
70
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
71
Guocang Huan, China’s Open Door Policy, 39 J. INT’L AFF. 1, 1–18 (1986).
72
See id.
73
See id.
74
See id. See also UNCTAD, supra note 3.
75
See UNCTAD, supra note 3.
69
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was the establishment of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1966, which
provided facilities for investment dispute resolutions
between investors and host states with conciliation and
arbitration.76
In 1985, focusing on FDI outreach for developing
economies and foreign investment protection against noncommercial risk, the convention establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was organized and
went into effect in April 1988.77 MIGA was established with
an objective to encourage investment flow for productive
purposes and particularly to the developing economies by
issuing guarantees and reinsurances against non-commercial
risk regarding investments, and today boasts of membership
of 182 states.78
Besides the focus on the investor’s protection, this
era further emphasized the developing states’ protection of
sovereignty as well as the international cooperation for
balanced development. 79 Although investors’ obligations
and state sovereignty were declared by the United Nations
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources in 1961, this era also strengthened the same by the
United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration of the
Establishment of the New Economic Order. 80 This
establishment of the new international economic order was
“based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence and
common interest and cooperation among all States” with a
focus to “correct inequalities and redress existing injustice . . .
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965-Apr. 10, 2006, 80 Stat. 344, ICSID/15.
77
See generally Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency, opened for signature Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1605 (entered
into force Apr. 12, 1988).
78
See id. See also Member Countries, MULTILAT. INV. GUAR. AGENCY,
https://www.miga.org/member-countries/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
79
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
80
G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), (May 1, 1974).
76
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eliminate the widening of the gap between developed and
developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating
economic and social development.”81
However the most significant global development
to institutionalize, systematize, and establish the legal
framework for international trade and trade facilitation was
the establishment of United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1966.82 To date,
UNCITRAL plays an important role in developing the
framework to harmonize international trade law by
preparing and promoting the use and adoption of legislative
and non-legislative instruments in a number of key
commercial law areas.83 “In the years since its establishment,
UNCITRAL has been recognized as the core legal body of
the United Nations system in the field of international trade
law.”84
Furthermore, another failed attempt to establish
multilateral investment rules was launched by the United
Nations, initiating negotiations on a Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations and a Code of Conduct on the
Transfer of Technology. 85 The states’ failure to globally
find a solution to reconcile and protect the interests of
developed states regarding their investment, along with the
issue of protection of sovereignty and interests of developing
and socialist states and the treatment of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) according to their domestic laws, led to
its failure. 86 However, some success was found with the
adoption of “Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable
Id.
See generally G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), (Dec. 17, 1966).
See generally UNCITRAL, U.N., A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL: BASIC FACTS
ABOUT UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
(2013),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/uncitral/en/12-57491-guide-to-uncitral-e.pdf.
84
Id.
85
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 123.
86
Id.
81
82
83
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Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business
Practices” by the General Assembly in 1980.87
Even though this era was marked by contradictions
arising from socio-political and economic reasons, states had
started to identify the significance of FDI for economic
development which led to the expansion of the global IIA
regime to 375 IIAs including 352 BITs and 23 TIPs.88 As
per the records available, starting from 1970, the FDI inflow
was recorded at $13,257 million and FDI outflow as $14,141
million, whereas, by the end of this era in 1989, the FDI
inflow had significantly surged to $196,897 million and FDI
outflow to $230,920 million.89
4. Era of Expansion (1990–2007)
As domestic discontentment grew, combined with a
receding economy, the communist states with Marxist
economies soon found themselves in desperate need for
social, political, and economic reforms. 90 With the
implementation of reforms of “Perestroika” (restructuring)
and “Glasnost” (openness) in the Soviet Union,91 focusing
on social, economic, and political liberalization while
interlinking socialism and democracy, followed by the
historical event of the fall of the Berlin wall and the
consequent reunification of Germany, it soon became clear
that the presence of the Marxist economic days were
numbered. 92 The subsequent chain of events led to the
disintegration and dissolution of the USSR in 1991 which
Id.
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
See UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 5.
90
See Seweryn Bialer, The Death of Soviet Communism, 70 FOREIGN AFFS. 166
(1991). See also UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
91
See R. G. Gidadhubli, Perestroika and Glasnost, 22 ECON. & POL.
WKLY. 784, 784–787 (1987).
92
See Gregory v.S. McCurdy, Note, German Reunification: Historical and
Legal Roots of Germany's Rapid Progress Towards Unity,
22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253 (1990). See also Floy Jeffares, The Gentle
Revolution: German Unification in Retrospect,
20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 537 (1992).
87
88
89
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marked the fall of the Marxist economies and opened the
possibilities of the establishment of a global economy based
on the principles of economic liberalization and free trade.93
The fall of USSR was followed by the transition of various
Marxist economies to accommodate principles of
liberalization and most importantly the recognition of
private property. 94 Such economies were identified by
UNCTAD as transition economies.95 As the contradiction
between socio-political and economic ideologies followed
by states settled down, this era was the most significant one
in terms of the expansion of the FDI, IIAs and surge in ISDS
regime.96
As more states increasingly recognized the
importance of FDI in terms of economic development and
further with the entry of the transition economies, the race to
attract foreign investors intensified amongst the states which
led to formulation of favorable domestic investment and
economic policies.97 As IIAs were considered a significant
instrument for attracting foreign investors, the competition
to sign multiple IIAs also intensified leading to rapid global
expansion of the IIA regime. The focus to attract foreign
investors with most countries realizing the importance of
FDI led the states to introduce more liberal reforms
favorable to the foreign investors to stabilize and boost their
morale.98
Due to the materialization of liberal reforms
introduced by various states and rapid expansion of IIAs, this
era saw a huge surge in global FDI flow and observed an
increasing dependency of economies on FDI. 99 Potential
See Bialer, supra note 90. See also UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17;
Vandevelde, Political Economy, supra note 1.
94
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 123.
95
See UNCTAD, Development Status, supra note 2.
96
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
97
See UNCTAD, Development Status, supra note 2.
98
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 125.
99
See UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 5.
93
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foreign investors, who majorly belonged to the developed
economies, saw new opportunities to invest in developing
economies and transition economies and accordingly
directed the FDI flow towards them. 100 Whereas the FDI
outflow of the developed economies were recorded to have
surpassed their FDI inflow, a reverse phenomenon was
observed with the developing economies where FDI inflow
was recorded as more than the FDI outflow.101
According to UNCTAD’s available statistics, at the
beginning of this era in 1990, the outward flow of FDI from
developed economies was calculated at $230,767 million
and the inward flow as $170,252 million, whereas the
outward flow of FDI from developing economies was
$13,108 million and the inward flow stood at $34,636
million.102 By the end of this era in 2007, the outward flow
of FDI from developed economies surged to $1,912,709
million and the inward flow to $1,373,550 million whereas,
the outward flow of FDI of developing economies was
calculated to $278,702 million and the inflow to $533,179
million.103
Recognizing developing and transition economies’
potential to attract FDI, by the end of this era, there was a
relative fall in the FDI inflow to the developed economy
along with a relative rise in FDI inflow to the developing
economies.104 Whereas in 1990, around 83% of the global
FDI inflow was attributed to developed economies and
around 17% to developing economies, in 2007, the FDI
inflow to the developed economies shrunk to 72% while the
developing economies expanded to around 28%.105
With a surge in FDI inflow in the developing states
and their consequent stabilization and development, by the
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
See UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 5.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
See id.
105
Id.
100
101
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end of the era, these developing economies also expanded
their FDI outflow.106 Where in 1990, around 95% of the
global FDI outflow was attributed to developed economies
and around 5% to the developing economies, in 2007, the
FDI outflow from developed economies shrunk to 87% and
relative surge was observed in developing economies
capturing around 13% of the global FDI. 107
Furthermore, due to the tremendous surge in its
flow and recognition during this era, FDI started playing a
significant role in the economies which increasingly became
dependent on it.108 Whereas in 1990, the percentage ratio of
global FDI inflow to the global GDP was 0.89% and the FDI
outflow was 1.12%, in 2007, the same surged to 3.28% and
3.81% respectively. 109 Similarly, the recognition and
dependence of the developing economies on FDI was also
evident with the percentage ratio of FDI inflow to the GDP
surging from 0.87% in 1990 to 3.35% in 2007.110 However,
a relatively lower increase in the percentage ratio of FDI
outflow to GDP was observed from 0.35% in 1990 to around
1.81% in 2007, whereas, for the developed economies, the
same surged from 1.28% in 1990 to 4.54% in 2007.111
As far as transition economies are concerned (which
at that time were Marxist economies), not much data is
available regarding any FDI outflow till 1990 with
UNCTAD and had recorded FDI inflow of merely $75
million, the percentage ratio of which to GDP was only
0.01%. 112 With the USSR’s fall and introduction and
materialization of the liberal economic reforms, the
transitional economies too, like the developing economies,
become the destination of the FDI from potential global
See id.
Id.
108
See id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
106
107
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investors. 113 By the end of this era, in 2007, transition
economies recorded a phenomenal surge in FDI inflow to
$87,233 million and an FDI outflow of $49,180 million.114
Consequently, the percentage ratio of FDI inflow to the GDP
increased to 4.83% and the percentage of FDI out flow to
2.80%.115
Although there was a sudden surge in the global
FDI and IIA regime, many states, even after realizing the
importance of FDI and introducing liberal reforms, were still
cautious of the dependency of their economies on
unpredictable foreign investment and opening their domestic
economy to the global market’s volatility. 116 The reasons
varied from a neocolonial approach towards foreign
investment to being overcautious of preventing the capitalist
takeover of the domestic economy to balancing the domestic
market and foreign investment to prevent the destruction or
its takeover by the foreign investors. 117 Although the
economic Marxism had fallen globally, the insecurities
towards FDI still persisted within many states. 118 These
insecurities had their roots connected to the past economic
and political structure of those states which believed in
state’s control over the economy, even though to a limited
extent.119 However, this cautious approach did not prevent
the expansion of IIAs globally. IIAs are now considered as
a necessity for the global competition for foreign
investment.120
From 381 BITs in 1980s, the number surged to
2,067 BITs by the end of 2000, with an average of three BITs
See id. See also UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 123.
Id.
Id.
116
See Vandevelde, Political Economy, supra note 1. See also Vandevelde,
Brief History, supra note 21.
117
Id.
118
See id.
119
Id.
120
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 123.
113
114
115
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signed per week. 121 Collectively, 2,668 new IIAs were
signed in this era expanding to a total of 3,079 IIAs
signed.122 In this context, the most significant development
in terms of reformation in economic policy of developing
states and expansion of their IIA network came from India
and China—which were considered to have the most
potential to attract FDI.123 The economic reform adoption
and implementation in China in the form of “Open Door
Policy” in the previous era materialized during this era and
set an example for the developing countries. 124 India,
realizing the necessity of reforms for economic development
and to integrate the Indian economy with the global
economy, introduced the New Industrial Policy in June 1991
and initiated reforms of macroeconomic stabilization and
structural adjustment with support from the IMF and the
World Bank. 125 During this era, collectively, India and
China signed a total of 175 BITs and 16 TIPs: China signing
108 BITs and 6 TIPs whereas India’s share was 67 BITs and
10 TIPs.126
Considering the rapid expansion of international
trade and its significance in the global economy, it became
necessary to develop and regulate it with the aim to
structuralize, systematize, and stabilize the same at the
global level. 127 In this context, the most significant
development was the establishment of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1994 as an international
organization aiming to develop rules of trade between states
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
See UNCTAD, supra note 3.
123
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
124
See UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 5. FDI inflow for
China recorded in 1980 was $57 million, $4,366 million in 1991 and thereafter
rose phenomenally to $11,008 million by 1992 and to $27,515 million by 1993.
125
Nagesh Kumar, Liberalisation and Changing Patterns of Foreign Direct
Investments: Has India’s Relative Attractiveness as a Host of FDI
Improved?, 33 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1321, 1329 (1998).
126
See UNCTAD, supra note 3.
127
Id.
121
122
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and ensure a free, predictable, and smooth flow of trade.128
To fulfill its purpose, WTO agreements have been signed
and negotiated with various states such as General
Agreement on Trade and Service (GATS)129, Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)130 and Trade
Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 131
Whereas its predecessor GATT mainly dealt with trade in
goods, the WTO and its various agreements covered trade in
services and intellectual property and also reformed the
procedures for dispute resolution.132
Furthermore, in 1994, the Energy Charter Treaty
was signed, incorporating detailed provisions for investment
and establishing the Energy Charter Conference, which
today has a membership of fifty-two states consisting of
developed, developing and transitional economies and
various other observers.133 Other developments in this era
included the adoption of World Bank Guidelines on the
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment in 1992, the signing
of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992

See About WTO, WTO
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm#:~:text=The%20World
%20Trade%20Organization%20(WTO,and%20ratified%20in%20their%20par
liaments (last visited Mar. 3, 2022).
129
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, Coverage
and Disciplines, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsqa_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2022).
130
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/trims_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2022).
131
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2022).
132
Birth of WTO: History of the Multilateral Trading System, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/history_e/history_e.htm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2022).
133
See UNCTAD, supra note 3 (for list of observers). See also UNCTAD,
World 2015, supra note 17.
128

433

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

25

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 4
[Vol. 22: 409, 2022]

Standing at Crossroads
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

(NAFTA) and their subsequent adoption of APEC NonBinding Investment Principles in 1994.134
For the foreign investors, apart from
accommodating themselves in the new socio-political and
economic structure of the host state, faced the primary
challenges of regarding indirect and direct expropriation, fair
and equitable treatment or minimum standard of treatment
including denial of justice, full protection and security,
arbitrary and discriminatory measures of the host states,
losses incurred due to domestic instability of the host state,
and many others.135 In many cases, such challenges proved
to be fatal for investments by investors in the host states and
being contrary to the protections guaranteed by the host state
via an underlining IIA.136 This ultimately made the investors
invoke dispute resolution clauses by the underlining BITs or
various other IIAs.137 Under these circumstances, and with
an increasing global liberalization, foreign investors felt a
necessity to revisit the protections guaranteed under the
IIAs. 138 As the first generation IIAs provided weak
protection to the investors, the majority of the states, in the
midst of an intense competition to attract FDI, further
enhanced the protections afforded under IIAs signed during
this era and renegotiated the previous IIAs to fulfill this
objective.139 As a corollary, a simultaneous surge occurred
in the ISDS in this era.140 As per the data available in public
domain, 290 ISDS were initiated by the investors against the
host states through the protections and dispute resolution
clauses provided by the underlining IIAs.141

See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
See UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
140
See UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
141
See id.
134
135
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Soon, a majority of the states found themselves at
the defensive side of the ISDS proceedings with the
investors claiming huge amounts as damages before arbitral
tribunals, while questioning the policies and actions or noncompliance of the obligations as agreed upon by those states
and mentioned in the underlining IIAs.142 As per the data
available in public domain, eighty-seven of the ISDS
initiated during this era were decided in favor of the
investors, while ninety-two were decided in favor of the
states.143 Furthermore, seventy-six cases were settled while
five cases were decided in favor of neither of the parties
(liability found by the tribunal but no damages awarded).144
Surprisingly, four cases are still pending; with the oldest case
being AES v. Argentina under the Argentina-United States
of America BIT (1991) pending since 2002, while twentythree cases were discontinued.145
5. Era of Revision (2008–2019)
Starting from 2007, the expansion of IIA and FDI
regime started slowing down as various loopholes were
uncovered in the prevailing international investment regime,
leading to increasingly desperate calls to revisit the issues of
this novel jurisprudence.146 As multiple prevailing issues in
the regime were recognized, states grew more impatient and
therefore this era was characterized by identification of the
issues of the IIA rulemaking and multiple efforts to address
and reorganize the same.147
The global financial crisis that surfaced in 2008
resulted in a sudden downfall of both the inward and outward

Id.
See id.
144
See id.
145
See id. (out of the 290 cases initiated during this era, details of 3 are not
available with UNCTAD).
146
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
147
See UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
142
143
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flow of global FDI.148 In 2008, the global FDI inflow fell to
1,490,066 million from 1,891,708 million in the previous
year, and the global FDI outflow to 1,712,738 million from
2,170,461 million, respectively.149 Initially, the crisis had a
direct impact on the FDI inflow of the developed states as
the developing and transitional states still projected a growth
of FDI inflow. 150 From $522,392 million in 2007 to
$578,020 million in 2008, the developing states continued
the trend of an expanding FDI inflow, but experienced a fall
in 2009 by dropping to $ 460,252 million.151 Similarly, the
transitional economies also continued the trend of expansion
of FDI inflow in 2008 being recorded at $117,733 million
from $87,233 million in 2007, but plummeting down to
$61,840 million in 2009.152 Consequently, the percentage
ratio of FDI inflow to the global GDP also fell from 3.77%
in 2007 to 2.72% in 2008 and further to 1.98% in 2009.153
The global economic crisis had also touched upon the long
running insecurity of developing economies to increase their
dependency and exposing their economies to highly volatile
FDI.154 Although maintaining the trend of the expansion of
FDI in 2008, as mentioned hereinabove, the percentage ratio
of FDI inflow to the GDP of developing economies had still
dropped from being 3.32% in 2007 to 3.15% in 2008 and
further to 2.55% in 2009. 155 The economic crises
emphasized on desperate need to strengthen the regulatory
framework of the economy, including investment.156
Another issue that had raised many eyebrows were
the proceedings of ISDS that had proliferated multifold
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17. See also UNCTAD, Foreign
Direct Investment, supra note 5.
149
See UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 5.
150
Id.
151
See id.
152
See id.
153
See id.
154
Id.
155
See id.
156
See UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
148
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during this era. Both developing and developed states saw a
number of ISDS cases being initiated by investors which
were now increasingly becoming complex and involved
more difficult questions of law evaluating the thin line
between regulatory permitted activities of the state and acts
of illegal interference with rights of the investors for which
the investors are to be compensated.157 In a span of twelve
years, the relationship between the investors and host states
became far more complex as both the developed and
developing states saw a staggering surge in ISDS with 739
new cases being initiated between 2008-2019.158 This figure
was just less than thrice the number of new cases initiated in
the previous era, which was limited to 290 cases between
1990–2007.159 It was perceived that the foreign investors
were questioning the actions of the states taken in the interest
of the economy of the host state and took advantage of the
liberally drafted IIAs to invoke the ISDS to be adjudicated
by a tribunal which lacked transparency and
accountability. 160
Other critics also pointed out
inconsistences in the awards; appointments, independence
and impartiality of members of the tribunals; lack of
accountability of the members of the tribunals; lack of
corrective mechanisms; etc. 161 The significance and
increasing dependency of the global economy on FDI , the
multiple issues of the ISDS regime, and the rising
complexities and amount of compensation sought by the
investors and awarded by arbitral tribunal in many high
profile cases could not be ignored and was raising many
eyebrows. 162 Soon thereafter, countries like the United
States and Canada adopted a more transparent model which
See id.
UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
159
See id.
160
See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potesà, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement and National Courts, EUR. Y.B. ON INT’L ECON. L. (2020).
161
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, supra note 4.
162
UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
157
158
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involved open hearings, publication of documents, and the
ability of a non-disputing party to submit an amicus curie
brief to the tribunal. 163 Critics also point out foreign
investors are treated more favorably than domestic investors,
where the foreign investors, without exhausting the domestic
remedies available to them, could initiate ISDS proceedings
before the tribunal members who were appointed on an adhoc basis and review the states’ actions and policies.164
IIAs also stopped expanding. States started to doubt
the feasibility of broadly drafted IIAs as a tool to facilitate
FDI.165 Conservatives in many states pointed out the issues
of the IIA and FDI regime and compared the foreign
investment to a neocolonialist tool of the developed
capitalist states.166 Critics also blamed the liberal economic
policies which adversely affected the domestic markets and
exposed the same to the highly volatile foreign markets.167
In this era, states restructured their IIAs because the financial
crisis demonstrated the dangers domestic economies
exposed to a vulnerable and volatile global market and
uncovered the complexities of ISDS and domestic
relationships with foreign investors.168 The competition to
sign IIAs and attract foreign investment slowed down and
states became reluctant to sign the liberally drafted IIAs
which were prevalent in the previous era.169 States began
reevaluating the benefits of the IIA regime compared to its
cost and its alignment with their future goals. 170 As the
confidence in IIA eroded, only 642 IIAs were signed (which
included 494 BITs and 148 TIPs) while a staggering number

Id.
Kaufmann-Kohler & Potesà, supra note 160, at 8.
165
Id. at 15–16.
166
Vandevelde, Brief History, supra note 21, at 166.
167
Id. at 166–67.
168
UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 124.
169
Id.
170
Id.
163
164
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of 270 IIAs were terminated during this era. 171 Facing
mounting pressure to address the issues, many states grew
restless and opted for radical steps, including renouncing
ICSID membership, terminating IIAs, and announcing a
moratorium on negotiations of future IIAs. 172
Recognizing the strong backlash and issues faced
by the states regarding the ever-growing complexities of
ISDS and IIAs, the need to address these issues were felt
even at the global level.173 Noticing the pressing social and
environmental challenges and persistent crisis, UNCTAD’s
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development
(IPFSD) recognized the priority of mobilizing investment to
ensure its contribution to the sustainable development. 174
Launched in 2012, this framework was designed to guide
policymakers by setting out principles for investment
policymaking of both national and international investment
policies regimes and options for better usage and drafting of
IIAs.175 The framework has served as a reference for many
policymakers for negotiating IIAs by the states and also for
formulating national investment policies.176
Another major change during this era was the
formation of Working Group III in 2017 to work on possible
reforms of the ISDS after the UNCITRAL identified various
issues in the ISDS’ jurisprudence.177 The government-led
Working Group III considers the expertise of its stakeholders
as it (1) identifies and considers concerns regarding ISDS,
(2) considers if any reform is desirable in the light of any
identified concern, and (3) concludes if the reform is

UNCTAD, supra note 3.
UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 124.
173
Id. at 124-25.
174
Id. at 125.
175
UNCTAD, IPFSD, supra note 18, at 86.
176
Id.
177
Rep. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., supra note 15.
171
172
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desirable and develops any relevant solution to be
recommended.178
Following the UNCTAD’s IPGSD, multiple states
started reorganizing their approach towards IIAs to address
the growing concern against IIAs and FDI along with the rise
in the number and complexities of ISDS adversely affecting
the relationship of states and foreign investors.179 Mounting
criticism from civil societies and realignment of the future
objectives towards sustainable development led the states to
reform their IIAs by revisiting their BIT models and
introducing new generation IIAs.180 Many states introduced
new “model BITs” which helped them clarify their position
regarding investor protections and obligations and which
served as a template for future BIT negotiations, achieving
uniformity and maintaining international standards. 181
States terminated the previous generation’s BITs and
renegotiated them with states based on the new model
BITs. 182 Even though each treaty is finalized and signed
after negotiations and is drafted with such provisions that are
convenient to the states, model BITs help in the negotiations
and to clarify the intentions of the parties.183 Learning from
the previous mistakes, these model BITs focused on
clarifying the meaning and scope of investment obligations,
including the foreign investors’ most alleged minimum
standard of treatment and indirect expropriation. 184
Additionally, these new model agreements prepared by the
states included specific provisions which aimed at clarifying
Id.
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 2.
180
UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 124.
181
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 113 (“Since 2012, over 75
countries and REIOs benefited from UNCTAD support for the development of
new model BITs and IIA reviews (WIR19)”). See also UNCTAD, World 2015,
supra note 17; International Investment Agreements Reform Accelerator, supra
note 16, at 2.
182
UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 124.
183
Id.
184
UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17.
178
179
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that the investment protection provided to the foreign
investors and further clarified that the objectives of
economic liberalization of the state must not override the
protection of health, safety, the environment, and the
promotion of internationally recognized labor rights. 185
Soon, states started introducing innovative clauses in IIAs to
reduce the ISDS while maintaining the balance between the
confidence in foreign investors and sovereignty of the states
and focusing on sustainable development. 186 Through the
new generation IIAs based on model BITs and other model
IIAs, states have provided narrow interpretations and
clarification of the provisions focusing on improving the
ISDS procedures to make the same more predictable,
elaborate, and transparent.187
a) Analysis of a Model BIT in the era of Revision—
An example of India
Although multiple states have introduced model
BITs, India, which terminated its previous BITs to
renegotiate treaties based on its Model BIT, is a perfect
example of the development and dynamism of this novel
jurisprudence, which terminated its previous BITs to
renegotiate new treaties based on its new Model BIT. 188
India’s economy was destroyed and looted by the British
Empire during the colonial era, and it developed a socialist
economy in the eras of evolution and contradiction. 189 India
introduced liberal economic reforms in the era of expansion
after realizing the importance and contribution of FDI to
develop its economy. 190 After introducing the liberal
reforms in 1991, India followed the global trend and signed

Id. at 124.
See UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 2.
187
Id. UNCTAD, World 2015, supra note 17, at 124.
188
UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
189
SHASHI THAROOR, INGLORIOUS EMPIRE: WHAT THE BRITISH DID TO INDIA
(2017).
190
Kumar, supra note 125, at 1321.
185
186
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ninety-six IIAs with multiple states until 2014, 191 which
consequently led to its FDI inflow jump from $252 million
in 1992 to $34,582 million in 2014, and the percentage ratio
of FDI to the GDP from 0.09% in 1992 to 1.69% in 2014.192
One of India’s main concerns was continuously
finding itself as a respondent in multiple ISDS proceedings
initiated by foreign investors. 193 It started with White
Industries Australia Limited v. Republic of India,194 which
was the first publicly known ISDS case that was partly
awarded in favor of the investor against India. 195 The
Honorable Tribunal in its final award referred to article 4(2)
of the BIT between Australia and India as a “Most Favored
Nation (MFN) clause” and thereafter referred to article 4(5)
of the India-Kuwait BIT, which created an obligation upon
the contracting parties to provide “effective means of
asserting claims and enforcing rights.”196 It further held that
the “Indian judicial system’s inability to deal with White
Industries’ jurisdictional claim in over nine years and the
Supreme Court’s inability to hear White Industries’
jurisdictional appeal for over five years amounts to undue
delay and constitutes a breach of India’s voluntarily assumed
obligation of providing White Industries with ‘effective
means” of asserting claims and enforcing rights.”197
An attempt to undermine the judiciary by an
international tribunal highlighting the “undue delay” by the
judiciary was an embarrassment for India.198 In the years
UNCTAD, supra note 3.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, supra note 4.
Until September 2020, India had been engaged as respondent in at least 25
publicly known ISDS. UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
194
White Indus. Australia Ltd. v. India, IIC 529 (UNCITRAL 2011).
195
UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
196
White Indus. Australia Ltd. v. India, IIC 529, at ¶ 11.4.19 (UNCITRAL
2011).
197
Id.
198
See, e.g., Abraham C. Mathews, Opinion, Cairn Energy Case/India needs to
have a better strategy in place, MONEY CONTROL (June 2, 2021)
https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/cairn-energy-case-india191
192
193
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that followed, India was subjected to more ISDS initiated by
foreign investors. 199 These ISDS included challenges to
various governmental regulatory measures. 200 White
Industries urged the government to address issues of the IIA
regime and to implement reforms. 201 Foreign investors
started raising questions about balancing India’s investment
protections with their exercise of regulatory power. 202
Report No. 246 on Amendments to the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act recognized the need to mitigate the
government’s risk from foreign investors’ claims while also
boosting their confidence.203 In March 2015, the draft of the
Model BIT was made public by the government of India and
was examined by the Law Commission of India in its Report
No. 260; the Law Commission of India’s suggestions
aligned with the government’s objective to encourage
“doing business” in India.204 By that time, India had signed
a total of eighty-three BITs and various other FTAs, seventyfour of the FTAs with dedicated chapters on investment were
in force.205
As anticipated, on December 28, 2015, India
introduced new model BITs replacing its previous model
BIT of 2003. 206 Soon thereafter, between 2016 to 2019,

needed-a-better-strategy-that-didnt-question-its-reputation-for-abiding-by-therule-of-law-6902341.html (noting that the White Industries award was perhaps
the most embarrassing of India’s “chequered history with international
arbitration.”).
199
From 2012 to 2019, fifteen publicly known cases have been initiated against
India. See UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
200
Law Commission of India, Analysis of the 2015 Draft Model Indian Bilateral
Investment Treaty, Report No. 260, 3 (Aug. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Rep. 260].
201
Law Commission of India, Amendments to Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
Report No. 246, 17–18 (Aug. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Rep. 246].
202
Rep. 260, supra note 200, at 3.
203
Rep. 246, supra note 201, at 17.
204
Rep. 260, supra note 200, at ii.
205
Id. at 1.
206
Office Memorandum F No. 26/5/2013-IC, Dept. of Econ. Aff. Inv. Div.,
Gov. of India Ministry of Finance (Dec. 28, 2015).
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India terminated a total of sixty-six BITs with other states.207
Although the new Model BIT included multiple progressive
provisions, it curtailed and limited the protections and
obligations afforded to foreign investors.208 Compared to
the 2003 model, the 2015 model was explicitly and precisely
drafted.209 It balanced the goal of promoting and protecting
foreign investors’ interests and exercise of the regulatory
power of the government while also aligning the IIA regime
with sustainable development and the Government’s
objectives.210
A few relevant provisions of the Model BIT include
Article 1.4, which defined “investment” in a more specific,
enterprise-based definition,211 which became a concern for
the government of India imposing excessive strain on its
regulatory space.212 This meant that an investment had to be
“an enterprise” in the form of a legal entity as defined under
article 1.3 of the Model BIT, and is “constituted, organized
and operated in good faith by the investor in accordance with
the law of the party in whose territory it is made.” 213
Interestingly, learning from the global developments in the
novel jurisprudence of ISDS, the definition follows the
elements/criteria to asses investments as discussed in Salini
Costruttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A v. Kingdom of
Morocco and focuses on the “assets of the enterprise” along
UNCTAD, supra note 3.
See MODEL TEXT FOR INDIAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY (2015)
[hereinafter MODEL BIT].
209
Cf. INDIAN MODEL TEXT OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT PROMOTION &
PROTECTION AGREEMENTS (2003) [hereinafter MODEL BIPA].
210
See MODEL BIT, supra note 208. See also id. at pmbl. for a discussion on
promoting and protecting investors.
211
See MODEL BIPA, supra note 209, at art. 1(b) (noting that the definition for
“investment” is asset-based, inclusive, and open-ended.).
212
Rep. 260, supra note 200, at 8–9.
213
See MODEL BIT, supra note 208, at art. 1.3 (“1.3 ‘enterprise’ means: (i) any
legal entity constituted, organised and operated in compliance with the law of a
Party, including any company, corporation, limited liability partnership or a
joint venture; and (ii) a branch of any such entity established in the territory of
a Party in accordance with its law and carrying out business activities there.”).
207
208
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with the “commitment of capital or other resources,”
“certain duration,” “expectation of gain or profit,” “the
assumption of risk,” and “significance for the development”
of the host state.214 Focusing to limit the ISDS, the model
BIT provides an exhaustive and specific definition of
investment, which explicitly demarcates and limits the scope
of protections afforded by the treaty to specific, bona fide,
and committed investors who are more likely to contribute
to economic growth.215
Furthermore, provisions like articles 2.2 and 2.4 of
the Model BIT further narrow down and limit its scope of
this model BIT.216 Article 2.2 provides for non-applicability
of the provisions of the treaty to pre-investment activities.217
Article 2.4 provides for non-applicability of the treaty to
numerous activities of the state like that of measures of the
local government, law or measures regarding taxation,
government procurement by a party to the treaty, subsidies
and grants provided by a party to the treaty, and noncommercial based services supplied in exercise of
government authority by relevant authority or body.218
Under Article 3 of the Model BIT, India has taken a
restrictive approach regarding parties’ obligations towards
the treatment of investors.219 Taking a traditional approach
over the popular “fair and equitable treatment” (FET),
Article 3.1 of the Model BIT protects the investments from
violation of CIL, i.e., general and consistent practices of the
states followed from a sense of legal obligation. 220 The
reason may be in response to the wide, ever expanding and
inconsistent interpretations that various tribunals have
Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4 (2003). See MODEL BIT, supra note 208, at art 1.4.
215
See MODEL BIT, supra note 208.
216
Id. at arts. 2.2 and 2.4.
217
Id. at art. 2.2.
218
Id. at arts. 2.2 and 2.4.
219
See id. at art. 3.
220
Id. at art. 3.1 and n.1.
214
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attributed to the FET, thereby expanding the ambit of its
protections like inclusion of “legitimate expectations” as an
integral part of FET while rendering inconsistent views
regarding its subjectivity and constitution without any
doctrinal basis.221 Such interpretations have led the FET to
become a problematic “catch all provision” for many host
states and capable of sanctioning many legislative,
regulatory and administrative actions.222 Thus, this can be
considered a rational new approach by India taken after
analyzing global trends while prioritizing protecting its
regulatory power and limiting the possibilities of disputes
with the foreign investors.
Furthermore, learning from White Industries and
limiting the unintentional invocation of provisions for
investment protection from other treaties by foreign
investors, the Model BIT does not include a “Most Favoured
Nation” (MFN) clause but provides for foreign investor
investment protection at par with its own domestic investors
by ensuring that they do not get less favourable treatment.223
Other specific favourable protections for foreign
investors’ investments in the model BIT includes: (1)
protection from direct and indirect expropriation or
nationalization of investments, with an exception to public
purpose, along with payment of compensation at a fair
market value in a freely convertible currency; 224 (2)
permission of free and non-discriminatory transfer of funds
and capital; 225 (3) provision for non-discriminatory
measures adopted for compensation of losses suffered by
investments made by foreign investors owing to war or other
armed conflict, civil strife, state or national emergency or a
natural disaster; 226 (4) recognition of the validity of
Rep. 260, supra note 200, at 15.
Id.
223
See MODEL BIT, supra note 208, at art. 4.
224
Id. at art. 5.
225
Id. at art. 6.
226
Id. at art. 7.
221
222
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subrogation in favour of the party state or its designated
agency to any right held by a foreign investor;227 and (5)
permission for entry of natural persons of the other party
employed by the investors for engaging in activities of the
investment.228
India’s attempt to specifically carve out protections
and clarify the same through the Model BIT will reduce
unnecessary claims and provide certainty and clarity for
potential foreign investors of their rights, obligations and
protections which may boost the confidence of bona fide
investors.229
The Model BIT also includes certain innovative and
progressive provisions. For example, a provision for
“transparency,” which creates an obligation on the parties,
to “the extent possible,” to make available or publish its laws,
regulations, procedures and administrative rulings to the
matters covered by the treaty.230 This section also provides
for reasonable opportunity to the interested persons and
other parties to comment on a proposed measure that the host
party wishes to adopt. 231 Similarly, investor obligations
provided under Chapter III, which are divided into Article
11, on which BITs usually remain silent or merely provide a
general obligation on investors 232 and Article 12, which
creates an obligation to voluntarily incorporate international
standards of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), may
address issues such as labor, the environment, human rights,
community relations and anti-corruption.233 A bare perusal
of these provisions points to the creation of specific
obligations of the investors that addresses the problems
Id. at art. 8.
Id. at art. 9.
229
See id.
230
Id. at art. 10.
231
Id.
232
Rep. 260, supra note 200, at 25–26 (calling for compliance with laws of the
parties).
233
See MODEL BIT, supra note 208, at art. 11–12.
227
228
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faced by most of the developing economies today.234 The
provisions for CSR, which are found in multiple IIAs today
especially in developing economies, are a step that will help
the government address social issues and achieve its political
aims. 235 Other provisions, like the provisions for anticorruption addressed in Article 11.2, Article 12 and Article
13.4, followed by specific provisions for an investor’s
compliance with the host state’s laws and regulations keep
them at par with domestic investors and transparent
concerning the investment as the party state may require.236
Chapter IV of the Model BIT deals with the
settlement of a dispute between an investor and a party with
specific application only to the breaches of the provisions of
Chapter II (obligation of parties), with exceptions of Articles
9 and 10 of the treaty, while clarifying its non-applicability
to breaches of contract between a party and an investor.237
Article 13.4 provides for disqualification of an investor to
submit claim to arbitration “if the investment has been made
through fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment,
corruption, money laundering or conduct amounting to an
abuse of process or similar illegal mechanism.”238 Another
attempt has been made to address the issues that have been
subject of discussions in various ISDS against the investors
and has largely been faced by developing economies. 239
Codifying of such provisions will address the issue from a

See id.
See UNCTAD, supra note 3. A total of forty IIAs have provisions for CSR
which includes twenty-seven BITs and thirteen TIPs with most of them having
at least one party being a developing economy. Id.
236
See MODEL BIT, supra note 208, at art. 10–13.
237
Id. at art. 13.3.
238
Id. at art. 13.4.
239
See World Duty Free Company, Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006); Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co KG v. Republic
of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24 (June 18, 2010); Metal-Tech, Ltd. v.
Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3 (Oct. 4, 2013); Phoenix
Action, Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5 (Apr. 15, 2009).
234
235
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social standpoint and attract FDI from bona fide foreign
investors.240
Another issue addressed by the Model BIT that has
been the subject of constant discussions is the invocation of
ISDS provisions of a treaty without exhausting the domestic
legal remedies available of the host state.241 On one hand,
some believe this undermines the host state’s legal system
and discriminates against the domestic investors, whereas on
the other hand, some believe it is an efficient and significant
protection for foreign investors to place their confidence in,
which is an important consideration. 242 Addressing this
issue, the Model BIT sets out the “conditions precedent to
submission of a claim to the arbitrator” by a foreign investor
and prescribes to first “submit its claim before a relevant
domestic court or administrating body” of the host state
within one year from the date the investor first acquired
knowledge of the measure in question.243 It further states
that after exhausting available domestic legal remedies, “for
at least a period of five years from the date on which the
investor first acquired the knowledge of the measure” and
“where no resolution has been reached,” the foreign investor
may thereafter commence proceedings and transmit a
“notice of dispute” to the defending party to initiate ITA.244
India, a developing economy attempting to address
various internal issues, learning from global developments,
and maintaining and expanding its FDI flow, serves as a
perfect example of dynamism and development of this novel

Prabhash Ranjan, Harsha Vardhana Singh, Kevin James & Ramandeep
Singh, India’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Are We Too Risk Averse?,
BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/indiasmodel-bilateral-investment-treaty-are-we-too-risk-averse/.
241
See MODEL BIT, supra note 208, at art. 15.1.
242
Compare Ranjan, Singh, James & Singh, supra note 240, at 21 with Corp.
Couns. Int’l Arb. Group, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Reform, 6–
7, (Dec. 18, 2019).
243
MODEL BIT, supra note 208, at art. 15.1.
244
Id.
240
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jurisprudence.245 The Model BIT clearly aims to maintain
the sovereignty of the state and its regulatory power over
foreign investors while limiting the scope of initiation of
ISDS. 246 Evidently, the Model BIT also points toward a shift
in the intention of the states regarding FDI and IIAs
(especially found with the developing states) from
prioritizing to attract maximum FDI to focusing on
regulating and channelizing the same for domestic economic
development.247 Compared to the previous generation IIAs
and the 2003 Model BIT of India, this new Model BIT
prescribes specific provisions that limit the protection
afforded to foreign investors, which may dissuade certain
foreign investors but will help India build a stable, regulated
economy with potential for growth, which may attract bona
fide foreign investors.248 Since introducing the Model BIT
on December 28, 2015, India has only signed three BITs up
to December 2020, with none of them in force. 249 Therefore,
it is yet to be seen whether the BITs executed by India under
the 2015 Model BIT has brought desired results.
Interestingly, in 2020, India’s foreign investment regime
experienced another setback because it lost two major ITAs
against its foreign investors Vodafone International
Holdings, BV, Cairn Energy, PLC, and Cairn UK Holdings,
Ltd.250
b) The End of the Era of Revision
Ranjan, Singh, James & Singh, supra note 240, at 14–15.
Id. at 5–7 (describing how conventional BITs interfere with state sovereignty
and regulatory schemes).
247
E.g. UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 28–35 (discussing the
downward trend of FDI investment in five African countries in 2019).
248
Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, ALLEN & OVERY (Aug. 5, 2016),
https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-andinsights/publications/indian-model-bilateral-investment-treaty.
249
UNCTAD, supra note 3.
250
After Vodafone, Now Cairn Energy Wins Arbitration against India over Tax
Dispute, THE WEEK (Dec. 23, 2020, 11:20 A.M.)
https://www.theweek.in/news/biz-tech/2020/12/23/after-vodafone-cairnenergy-wins-arbitration-against-india-over-tax-dispute.html;
UNCTAD,
Navigator, supra note 12.
245
246

450

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol22/iss2/4

42

Misra: Standing at Crossroads
[Vol. 22: 409, 2022]

Standing at Crossroads
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

The end of this era was marked by a decline in the
global FDI and IIA regime along with stronger criticism and
growing concern regarding the prevailing ISDS regime.251
In 2018, the global FDI inflows decreased by 13% to
$1,495,223, which was the third consecutive annual decline
despite an increase to $1,539,880 recorded in 2019. 252
Whereas the FDI inflow to developed economies rose by 5%
in 2019, which had been declining steadily since 2016, the
FDI inflow to developing economies declined marginally by
2% in 2019, which had been relatively stable since 2010.253
In 2019, despite the FDI inflow to developing Asian states
declining by 5% (primarily due to the plunge in FDI of about
34% in Hong Kong) China, it still remained the largest FDI
recipient region globally, attracting more than 30% of the
global FDI inflow. 254 On the other hand, the transition
economies saw a significant surge in FDI inflows with a 59%
increase (primarily due to recovery of FDI by Russia) and an
increase in the flow to newly liberalized Uzbekistan.255 On
the other hand, the global FDI outflows in 2019 were still
dominated by developed states with around 69.8%, while the
developing states accounted for around 28%, which had
sharply declined from 42% in 2018.256
By the end of 2019, 3,734 IIAs had been signed, out
of which 2,664 IIAs were in force.257 Interestingly, thirtyfour IIAs terminated in 2019 but only twenty-two IIAs
concluded (including sixteen BITs and six TIPs), a trend
which was also witnessed in 2017 when forty IIAs were
signed whereas fifty-five were terminated. 258 In terms of
See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, supra note 4; UNCTAD, Foreign
Direct Investment, supra note 5.
252
UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 5.
253
Id. UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 11.
254
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 11.
255
Id. at 12.
256
UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 5.
257
UNCTAD, supra note 3.
258
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 106; UNCTAD, supra note 3.
251
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progress of IIAs, in 2019 almost all the new IIAs followed
the UNCTAD’s Reform Package for the International
Investment Regime, focusing mainly on preserving states’
regulatory space followed by reforms in ISDS provisions
and sustainable development. 259 Furthermore, in 2019,
domestic policies were introduced focusing on the additional
rigorous screening of investments, especially in strategic
industries, by majorly all the developed economies for the
reason of concern over national security, which led to
multiple cross borders deals being blocked or withdrawn.260
At the regional level, significant developments
unfolded, like the agreement establishing the African
Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) taking effect, the
United Kingdom’s withdrawal from European Union
(Brexit), the European Union’s termination of Intra-EU BITs
following Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V., the EU Mercosur
Trade Agreement, the modernization of the Energy Charter
Treaty, and ratification of United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement. 261 Overall, in 2019, at least 107 reforms
affecting FDI were introduced by as many as 54 states,
mostly by developing and emerging economies in Asia,
amongst which three-fourths of the reforms were directed
towards liberalization, promotion, and facilitation of foreign
investment.262
By 2019, total ISDS cases had reached over 1,000,
with 55 additional known ISDS being initiated by foreign
investors in 2019 against 36 states and the European Union.
263 All the ISDS initiated in 2019 were under treaties signed
before 2012, and over 70% of them were brought under IIAs

UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 112.
Id.
261
Id. at 106–109.
262
Id. at xii.
263
UNCTAD, Int’l Inv. Agreements Issues: Note on Investor State Dispute
Settlement Cases Pass the 1,000 Mark: Cases and Outcomes in 2019 (July 2020)
[hereinafter UNCTAD, 1,000 Mark].
259
260
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signed before the 1990s.264 The number of these disputes are
likely to be higher as many arbitrations initiated in 2019 and
previous years are believed to be confidential. 265
Interestingly, 2019 was the year with the lowest number of
cases being initiated since 2013. 266 Among the cases
initiated in 2019, over 70% were initiated by investors from
developed states against respondent states, in which about
half of them were from developing and transitional
economies.267 Furthermore, in the majority of cases in 2019,
the investors challenged the actions of the host state, alleging
expropriation and violation of the principle of fair and
equitable treatment/minimum standard of treatment.268
6. The Covid and the Post-Covid Era
(2020–beyond)
The COVID-19 crisis, which emerged in October
2019 and by February 2020 was designated as a pandemic
by the World Health Organization, has drastically and
adversely affected the international trade regime. 269 The
severity of the crisis that resulted from the pandemic is
estimated to be relatively worse than two years following the
economic crisis of 2007, which started in the Era of
Revision.270
Global FDI is estimated to fall drastically by around
40% and experience the effects in 2021 when it is further
expected to decline by 5-10%.271 Consequently, for the first
time since 2005, the FDI would fall below $1 trillion and
may lead to stagnation or a negative growth trend for several
years.272 Considering the best forecast, the FDI is expected
Id. at 4; UNCTAD, supra note 3.
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 110.
266
UNCTAD, supra note 3 (fifty-five arbitrations were initiated in 2012).
267
UNCTAD, 1,000 Mark, supra note 263.
268
UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
269
WORLD HEALTH ORG., SITUATION REP. 51, CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019
(COVID-19) (2020); see UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16.
270
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 2.
271
Id. at x.
272
Id.
264
265
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to level with the pre-pandemic statistics in 2022. 273
Although such projections are quite uncertain and would
depend upon the lasting effect of the pandemic and
government policies to curb its effect on the healthcare
system, the gigantic scale of projected damage is expected
to bring multiple reforms to stabilize the investment trade
regime.274
To curb the spread of the pandemic, many states
have imposed lockdown measures that severely affect
foreign and domestic investors.275 Such measures resulted
in the physical closing of various establishments, such as
manufacturing plants, construction sites, and other places of
business. 276
Furthermore, several states introduced
temporary restrictive foreign investment policies, such as
directly restricting foreign investments in certain industries
and new additional screening requirements for FDI. 277
Although the objective of such policies may vary from state
to state, the two-fold objective seems to be the prevention of
an already fragile domestic industry from any hostile
takeover from a foreign investor and the protection of
strategic industries and industries related to healthcare to
prioritize and fulfill domestic demands.278 Certain examples
of such policies include measures taken by the European
Union introducing guidance for its members concerning
screening of FDI from non-members for protection of
Europe’s strategic assets, 279 and Australia’s investment
reviews to protect national interest and local assets from

Id.
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id. at 3.
277
Id. at 4.
278
Id.
279
See Guidance to the Member States concerning foreign direct investment
and free movement of capital from third countries, and the protection of
Europe’s strategic assets, ahead of the application of Regulation (EU)
2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation), COM (2020) 1981 final (Mar. 25, 2020).
273
274
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acquisition.280 Other trade restrictions included mandatory
production and export bans on necessary medical products
and equipment.281 To curtail the spread of the pandemic,
approximately fifty states introduced measures to restrict or
regulate the exports and imports of products necessary to
attend to the growing needs of public health.282 Subject to
necessity, many states, such as the United States of America
and certain states from the European Union, have reduced
their import duties to address immediate shortages of
necessary medical products.283
These restrictive measures have not only delayed
multiple projects and contractual obligations, but have also
increased the cost burden caused by the running fixed cost
on the investors. 284 Soon, FDI was found stuck in
government lockdown policies as investment projects got
stalled and delayed.285 The imbalance created by delays in
completion of projects, leading to increased costs, along with
delays in the earning of projected profits from such an
investment by an investor have adversely affected the
businesses globally.286 Furthermore, the uncertainty created
from an unexpected plunging global economy, sudden
changes in investment policies, and restriction on the
movement of capital and goods have deepened the crisis.287
These developments will hinder future investment plans of
investors due to liquidity issues caused by diverting funds to
cover additional costs and losses suffered during the
pandemic combined with uncertain economic prospects.288
Additionally, as many states are bearing massive additional
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16.
Id. at xi.
Id. at 90–93.
283
Id. at 4.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 5.
288
Id. at 4.
280
281
282
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financial burdens to mitigate the economic loss caused due
to crisis and diverting massive funds to healthcare programs,
there is a possibility that states may scrap or postpone future
projects that might have attracted large FDI.
The developing states are expected to be the most
affected in terms of the fall in FDI given their reliance on
investments in Global Value Chain (GVC) and intensive and
extractive industries, which have been severely hit. 289
Additionally, developing states’ lack of financial support
and economic limitations may prevent them from
introducing significant economic support packages or
measures.290 Certainly, the developing states will be worst
affected—a fall in FDI and lockdown measures directly
affecting its labor-intensive industries may consequently
lead to a staggering unemployment rate. 291 For such
situations, the governments need to gradually redirect the
excess funds from public healthcare programs to boost the
economy. 292 However, this can only happen when the
pandemic is under control. 293 For immediate relief, the
states might have to depend on stabilizing FDI back as soon
as possible.294 Such an alternative may not be that easy to
conquer as multiple states, especially the developing states,
may depend on such alternatives facing similar crisis,
thereby intensifying the competition to attract FDI
experienced in the Era of Expansion.295 On the other hand,
the foreign investors also may not be willing to invest further,
considering the limitation of liquidity caused by this crisis
and economic uncertainty.296 Furthermore, with the fall and
Id. at x.
Id. at 8.
Id.
292
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., THE TERRITORIAL IMPACT OF COVID-19:
MANAGING THE CRISIS ACROSS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 3 (2020).
293
Id. at 3.
294
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 40.
295
See Kumar, supra note 125.
296
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 4.
289
290
291
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delay in the profits of the major multinational enterprises,
the reinvested earnings, which account for 50% of the FDI,
may also lead to a sharp fall in future FDI.297
The increased restrictions on international trade and
change in the priority of the states to control the spread of
the pandemic consequently slowed down the development
and negotiation of new IIAs.298 Many new IIA negotiations
have either been postponed or cancelled, such as the
postponement of Brazil-Nigeria BIT, the new investment
protocol of AFCFTA, and the European Union-United
Kingdom Free Trade Agreement.299 The main reason for
postponement/cancellation of new IIAs may be the global
economy’s uncertainty along with a looming global
recession, which may have led the states to reserve such
negotiations after contemplating the economy’s future
requirements. 300 With only seven publicly known IIAs
signed this year, 2020 may likely have one of the lowest
numbers of IIAs following the Era of Contradiction. 301
Even though the development of IIAs has faced
stagnation, the situation may soon change as the lockdown
policies are relaxed and states again focus on bringing their
respective economies back on track. Although many relief
policies, such as monetary and fiscal measures, have been
announced by the respective governments, 302 it is clear that
FDI inflow can address the issues, especially for the
developing economies.303 To achieve this, states may soon
introduce liberal investment policies to promote and
facilitate FDI.304 International groups such as the G-7, G20,
and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, have already issued
Id. at x.
Id. at 94.
299
Id. at 117.
300
Id. at 94.
301
UNCTAD, supra note 3.
302
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 90.
303
Id. at iv.
304
Id. at 127.
297
298
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declarations in support of international investment.305 In an
attempt to maintain the FDI flow, stabilize the economy, and
address the growing unemployment in such unforeseen
circumstances, states have introduced multiple measures,
including online services and e-regulations and lifted
bureaucratic obstacles for stabilizing and boosting the
economy, such as the speeding up of approvals for labour
intensive and infrastructure projects, reduction of fees,
etc.306
Considering that the states may promote liberal
investment reforms to attract more FDI, states may prefer to
continue the 2019 trend from the height of the pandemic to
regulate FDI through stringent screening for investments to
protect essential and strategic industries from hostile
takeovers by foreign investors. 307 Although it has been
largely followed by developed economies, such balancing
between liberal policies and stringent measures may also be
necessary for developing states considering the fragile
condition of the domestic economy in the post COVID-19
era and a still persistent perception of the public towards
neo-colonialism. 308 Such a situation will also affect the
development of future IIAs as the same may lead to
incorporation of stringent and restrictive provisions of
investments regarding strategic assets and sectors
considered significant for national security.309
The post pandemic global investment regime may
also experience a surge in ISDS claims.310 Measures taken
by the states during this pandemic for public interest and the
benefit of their domestic economies, subject to their manner
of implementation, may have adverse implications on the

Id. at 94.
Id. at 87–88.
307
Id. at 92.
308
Id. at 81.
309
Id. at 148.
310
Id. at 95.
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operations of foreign investors. 311 Although the stringent
lockdown and restrictive trade measures imposed by the
states in response to the pandemic may be termed as a classic
“force majeure” situation for contractual obligations, this
might not stop desperate foreign investors facing huge losses
and increased costs resulting from such policies from
invoking ISDS provisions highlighting the host state’s
obligation under respective IIAs. 312 Through ISDS,
investors may question the host state’s measures, such as
restrictions imposed on imports/exports, investments of
strategic assets, movement of capital, scrapping/suspension
of projects, and challenge such measures for violating FET
principles and legitimate expectancy while terming such
measures taken for welfare of the state as discriminatory.313
The possibility of facing such a situation may be higher with
states that have liberally drafted IIAs with broader scope and
provisions.314
Appreciating the situation, on May 6, 2020, the
Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment called for a
complete moratorium on all ITA claims raised by any
foreign investors against respective host states until the end
of the pandemic.315 Furthermore, fearing a post pandemic
scenario of multiple ISDS raised against host states, they
have also called for a permanent bar on claims raised by
foreign investors against government measures implemented
for the benefit of the economy.316

Id. at 89.
Id. at 94. See also Paula M. Bagger, The Importance of Force Majeure
Clauses in the COVID-19 Era, AM. BAR ASSOC. (Mar. 25, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercialbusiness/boilerplate-contracts/force-majeure-clauses-contracts-covid-19/.
313
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 111–16.
314
Id. at 113.
315
Id. at 95.
316
Id.
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II.

Working Group III
The criticism against the prevailing ISDS regime
grew stronger and intensified in the Era of Revision, which
by 2017 was widely recognized and discussed at the global
stage.317 Apart from the growing number of ISDS, the main
concerns were regarding method of the appointment of
arbitrator, impartiality and independence of the arbitrators,
lack of coherence of ad-hoc tribunals, lack of review
mechanism, the cost and time constraint, and the lack of
transparency.318 In essence, the criticism of the ISDS regime
reflected the concern regarding democratic accountability
and legitimacy.319
To comprehensively identify and address the issues
in the ISDS regime, UNCITRAL assigned Working Group
III (WG-III) in 2017 with a broad mandate to: (1) identify
and consider concerns regarding ISDS; (2) consider if any
reform was desirable in the light of any identified concern;
and (3) develop any relevant solution if reform was
desirable.320
Like the UNCITRAL process, the WG-III was a
consensus-based government-led group, benefitting from
the widest possible experts and stakeholders, which was
given broad discretion to discharge its mandate.321 The WGIII agreed that it would initially focus on treaty-based
investment arbitration and would later consider its extension
over the contract and investment law based ISDS.322

U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, supra note 4.
Id.
319
Id.
320
U.N. Doc. A/72/17, supra note 15, at 46.
321
Id.
322
UNCITRAL, Rep. of WG-III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on
the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session-Part I, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930/Rev.1, at
6 (2017) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930/Add.1/Rev.1].
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A.

Identification of concerns in the ISDS
regime
Following the mandate, the WG-III, between its
thirty-fourth and thirty-ninth sessions, identified and
discussed multiple concerns in the ISDS regime and
concluded that reforms were desirable in the light of the
identified concerns, thereby completing the first two phases
of its mandate.323 For convenience, the concerns identified
by the WG-III have been categorized broadly into the five
categories below:
1. Concerns Regarding Consistency,
Coherence, Predictability and
Correctness of the Award
Concerns regarding consistency, coherence,
predictability and correctness of the award rendered by the
tribunal which include the concerns regarding different
interpretations of substantive standards, jurisdiction,
admissibility, and procedural inconsistencies. 324 The
present ISDS mechanism has been criticized for unjustified
inconsistencies with instances of similar investment treaty
provisions being interpreted differently by tribunals and
even an instance of concurrent proceedings in which facts,
parties, treaty provisions, and arbitration rules were
identical.325 The WG-III clarified that the concern was not
regarding interpretation of similar provisions identically in
all circumstances but focused on unjustified inconsistences
in such cases.326 It was identified that one of the primary
reasons for lack of consistency was divergent decisions
rendered by different tribunals in multiple and concurrent

UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166 (July 30, 2019) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166].
324
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, supra note 4.
325
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930/Add.1/Rev.1, supra note 322.
326
Id.
323
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ISDS proceeding. 327
Furthermore, the insufficient
mechanisms in the present ISDS regime to address such
inconsistencies, incoherence, lack of predictability, and lack
of correctness have also been recognized as a significant
concerns by the WG-III.328
It was observed that the ad-hoc tribunals have
lacked consistency while interpreting rules of customary
international law or the international rules of treaty
interpretations.329 Some examples of inconsistent decisions
include conflicting interpretations of the definition of
investments, whether investments made by a foreign
investor are supposed to be made for the benefit of the host
state, the proper application of the Most Favored Nations
(MFN) clause, the scope of indirect expropriation, the scope
of umbrella clauses, procedural decisions on security, and
annulment proceedings and enforcement of awards.330 The
WG-III has also observed inconsistencies by tribunals in the
interpretation of substantive protection standards like the
determination of FET standards, scope and applicability of
the doctrine of necessity, and commitments made by the
states under various IIAs to create “favorable investment
conditions.” 331 In cases of jurisdiction and admissibility,
inconsistent views have been taken by tribunals in ICSID
matters regarding the interpretations of the outer limit of the
jurisdictions under article 25(1) of the ICSID convention,
interpretation of jurisdiction of the tribunal post ICSID
denunciation, interpretation of the effective control of an
entity, interpretation of whether awards qualify as
UNCITRAL, Rep. of WG-III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on
the Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/964 (2018)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/964].
328
UNCITRAL, Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS):
Consistency and related matters, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.150 (Nov.
2018) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.150].
329
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/930/Add.1/Rev.1, supra note 322.
330
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.150, supra note 328.
331
Id. at 7.
327
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investments, and admissibility of multiple claims pursued by
related parties. 332 Other major procedural issues and
inconsistencies that have been observed in ISDS are
regarding scope and interpretation of the cooling off period,
interpretation of unilateral offer to arbitrate, initiation of
arbitration based on repealed foreign investment laws,
retrospective application of denial of benefit clause, the
requirement to exhaust local remedies, impact of pursing
claims before domestic courts prior to initiating ISDS,
interpretation of continuing breach as an exception to
limitation of filling claims, the allocation of costs, and legal
reasoning and methodology of evaluating claims.333
2. Concerns Regarding Arbitrators
And Decision Makers
Concerns regarding arbitrators and decision makers
were considered at the thirty-fifth session of the WG-III
from two main perspectives, viz. concerns regarding the
present ISDS regime guaranteeing the impartiality and
independence of the tribunal, and, concerns regarding the
appointment of the arbitrators having appropriate
qualifications and characteristics to decide a dispute.334 At
this session, the WG-III expressed concerns about the
impartiality and independence of the arbitrators prevailing in
the ISDS regime, focusing on the party-based appointments
and the incentives thereby created which has resulted in a
perception of biasness. 335 The remuneration of the
arbitrators by the parties and the lack of transparency in it,
along with an inclination of arbitrators for reappointment
have also fueled such perceptions. 336 Furthermore,
considering the ad-hoc appointments of the arbitrators, the
Id. at 7–9.
Id. at 9–10.
334
UNCITRAL, Rep. of WG-III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on
the Work of its Thirty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/935 (April 23–27,
2018).
335
Id.
336
Id.
332
333

463

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

55

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 4
[Vol. 22: 409, 2022]

Standing at Crossroads
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

WG-III also observed the overwhelming dissenting opinions
raised by the arbitrators appointed by the losing party which
raised the possibility of the arbitrators feeling duty bound
towards the appointing parties resulting in a perceived lack
of impartiality and independence.337
The prevailing mechanism to check independence,
impartiality, and bias is primarily based on voluntary
disclosure by the arbitrators regarding any potential conflict
of interest.338 This mechanism is prescribed under both the
UNCITRAL and ICSID rules.339 Other legal frameworks
include the International Bar Association (IBA) guidelines
which prescribes a detailed disclosure requirement. 340
However, it still does not address all relevant concerns like
the relationship between the arbitrator and the party or the
counsel.341 Furthermore, practices such as double hatting,
which involves switching of roles between individuals
acting as arbitrator, counsel, and expert in different ISDS
with a possibility of conflict of interest, have also been the
subject of significant controversy. 342 Even though the
majority of the arbitration laws and rules prescribe
procedures for challenging the appointment of arbitrators,
critics have identified limitations to these, including a lack
of transparency, limitations in the mechanism to sufficiently
address certain challenges like conflict of interest,
addressing frivolous challenges, and uniformity in its
application—especially with the ad-hoc arbitrations. 343
Pursuant to discussions of WG-III, it was considered
UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):
Ensuring Independence and Impartiality on the Part of Arbitrators and Decision
Makers in ISDS, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.151 (Nov. 2, 2018)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.151].
338
Id.
339
Id.
340
INT’L BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, Rule 7, (2014).
341
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.151, supra note 337.
342
Id.
343
Id.
337

464

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol22/iss2/4

56

Misra: Standing at Crossroads
[Vol. 22: 409, 2022]

Standing at Crossroads
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

desirable to address the concerns regarding the adequacy,
effectiveness, and transparency of disclosure in the present
challenge mechanism.344 Secondly, concerns have also been
raised regarding the prevailing mechanisms for constitution
of the tribunals in existing treaties and rules of arbitration.
The WG-III observed limitations by various stakeholders in
ensuring competence and qualifications of the arbitrators in
party-based appointment mechanisms, considering that the
required arbitrators should have a sound knowledge of the
impact of public interest and public policy, which has a
significant role in ISDS cases, along with sound knowledge
of domestic laws.345
Furthermore, the WG-III also observed the
concerns regarding the impact of party remuneration, limited
number of repeated appointments as arbitrators, and
dissenting opinions given by arbitrators, creating a
perception of bias and raising concerns over the prevailing
mechanism of constitution of the tribunal.346
Lastly, the WG-III has also identified the lack of
diversity in proportional representation of arbitrators in
terms of gender, age, ethnicity and geographical distribution,
which adversely impacts and undermines the policy
considerations of countries with developing economies
because the majority of appointed arbitrators are from
Western Europe and North America. 347 Such a disparity
raises concerns of lack of impartiality and arbitrator’s ability
to act independently and also affects the confidence of
developing states.
3. Costs and Duration of the ISDS
Proceedings
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/964, supra note 327.
UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):
Arbitrators and decision makers: Appointment mechanisms and related issues,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.152 (Nov. 2, 2018) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.152].
346
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, supra note 4.
347
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.152, supra note 345, at 5.
344
345
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Costs and duration of the ISDS proceedings have
also been identified as significant concerns by various
stakeholders, including states and other government
organizations, and were discussed by the WG-III in its 34th
Session. 348 Both the claimant investors and respondent
states have raised concerns over the heavy cost burden of the
proceedings.349 This issue has a significant impact over the
developing states who are not able to justify the use of their
limited financial and human resources in defending
themselves and their actions in such proceedings that are
subjected to heavy criticism. 350 On the other hand, the
burden of the cost is also heavy on small and medium scale
investors who may, after analyzing its financial feasibility,
ultimately decide not to pursue the remedy under ISDS. 351
The WG-III has also identified state concerns in recovering
costs against investors and has pointed out the necessity of
rules to secure costs.352
4. Third Party Funding and External
Financing
Third-party funding and external financing that are
available to investors, but not to the states, have created a
structural imbalance and have a direct impact over other
issues such as the impartiality of arbitrators, conflict of
interests, and enforcing the cost awarded by the tribunals.353
While identifying it as a significant concern, the WG-III has
also highlighted the concerns related to its definition of
third-party funding, lack of transparency, and lack of
regulation.354
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, supra note 4, at 4.
UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):
Cost and Duration, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.153, at 1, 3 (Aug. 30, 2018).
350
Id.
351
Id.
352
Id. at 8.
353
Id. at 4.
354
UNCITRAL, Rep. of WG-III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on
the Work of its Thirty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/970, at 1, 5–6 (April
9, 2019) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/970].
348
349
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5. Other Issues
Other issues that the WG-III have identified and
discussed range from other means of dispute prevention
methods, exhaustion of local remedies, third party
participation, counterclaims, regulatory chills, and
calculation of damages.355
B.
Proposed Reforms Submitted by WGIII
While moving towards accomplishing its broad
mandate and evaluating possible reform options, the WG-III
has taken into account the suggestions and proposals
submitted by several states, intergovernmental organizations,
the 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development Goal (SDG),
and the policy objectives of the ISDS regime. 356 The
proposed suggestions received from states and
intergovernmental organizations include promoting and
attracting investments and focusing on reducing poverty,
hunger, and environmental degradation while focusing on
the development of indigenous people, improving access to
affordable energy, and promoting decent work. 357 Other
proposals submitted by the states include focusing on
investment policies to ensure legal certainty, efficient and
equal protection to investors and investments, access to
efficient, effective and affordable mechanisms for
settlements; effective mechanisms for enforcement
procedures; focus on ISDS proceedings to be fair,
transparent with appropriate safeguards for preventing abuse
of process, and addressing diversity among tribunals.358
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166, supra note 323, at 3.
See Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, U.N.,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups/3/investor-state (the submissions of
all the stakeholders are available); G.A. Res. 70/1 (Sept. 25, 2015); U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166, supra note 323.
357
UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):
Submission from the Government of South Africa, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176, at 1, 5, 15 (July 17, 2019). See U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166, supra note 323.
358
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166, supra note 323, at 5.
355
356
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After identifying and discussing the concerns of the present
ISDS regime, the WG-III has broadly categorized and
presented possible reforms into the following eight subcategories:
1. Tribunals, Ad Hoc and Standing
Multilateral Mechanism
a) Multilateral Advisory Center
To focus on providing support and other facilities to
the developing and least developed states, the WG-III has
proposed for the establishment of an independent
multilateral advisory center following the model of the
advisory center on WTO Law (ACWL).359 It is suggested
that the Advisory Center be established as an
intergovernmental organization or through an appropriate
existing institution.360
At the 38th session of the WG-III held in Vienna,
general support was observed for establishing the advisory
center so it could address multiple concerns identified by the
WG-III like the cost of the proceedings, the lack of financial
and human resources available to developing and underdeveloped states, and maintaining decision accuracy and
consistency.361 The primary beneficiaries would be states,
preferably developing and under-developed states and states
with limited experience. 362 To prevent any conflict of
interest, claimant investors have been excluded from
receiving the services of the advisory center, but services to
small and medium sized enterprises are being considered.363
After a detailed discussion, the WG-III provided points for

UNCITRAL, Rep. of WG-III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on
the Work of its Thirty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/1004, at 1, 8 (Oct. 23,
2019).
360
Id. at 9.
361
Id. at 10.
362
Id. at 8.
363
Id.
359
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consideration and guidance for preparation work for the
establishment of the advisory center.364
b) Standalone Review or Appellate Mechanisms
Standalone review or appellate mechanisms would
be similar to the procedures of the International Court of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce,
which focuses on a procedure for prior scrutiny of an award
before it becomes final. 365 Other suggestions include
procedures for parties to submit written comments on the
award before it is finalized or scrutinizing the award through
an independent body without reviewing the merits of the
matter.366
On the other hand, a stand-alone appellate
mechanism, which would be a higher judicial authority
ensuring procedural and substantive consistency of BITs and
correcting errors in awards, has also been proposed.367 An
appellate mechanism may be a significant step towards
bringing consistency, predictability, and correctness in
arbitral awards through uniform treaty interpretations and
interpretations of legal principles of international law. Such
a reform may also have significant positive impact over the
legitimacy concerns of the present ISDS regime.
An appellate mechanism can co-exist with other
systems already in place and would also be helpful in
effectively implementing other reform options like
reviewing decisions of standing investment courts,
international commercial courts, regional investment courts,
and domestic courts.368 The mechanism may also have a
significant impact over ICSID arbitrations which exclude

Id. at 10.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166, supra note 323, at 6.
366
Id.
367
Id.
368
Id. at 7.
364
365
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any appeals or remedies except for the ones provided under
the ICSID convention itself.369
c) Standing First Instance And Appeal Investment
Court With Full Time Judges
These reform options involve establishment of a
first instance court and an appellate court for investment that
is based on submissions made by the European Union and
its member states. 370 Those options may be helpful in
addressing all the concerns identified by WG-III. These
options would include the establishment of a standing court
with full time adjudicators and two tiers of adjudications, i.e.,
the court of first instance and a court of appeals.371
Per the submissions received by the WG-III, the
court of first instance with its own procedure will fill in the
shoes of arbitral tribunals and hear disputes on facts and
apply relevant law,372 whereas the appellate court will hear
appeals arising out of the court of first instance on the limited
grounds of error of law and a manifest error in the
apprehension of facts.373
Again, such reform may have a significant positive
impact on the legitimacy concerns, may further address
significant concerns of transparency and consistency in the
ISDS regime, and there is a greater chance the majority of
states including developing states will better receive the
reforms.
2. Arbitrators and Adjudicators
Appointment Methods and Ethics

UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):
Appellate
and
Multilateral
Court
Mechanisms,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.185, at 1, 8 (Nov. 29, 2019) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.185].
370
UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):
Submission from the European Union and its Member States, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1, at 1, 4–5 (Jan. 24, 2019).
371
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.185, supra note 369, at 10–11.
372
Id.
373
Id.
369
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a) ISDS
Tribunal
Members’
Selection,
Appointment, and Challenge
This involves a variety of reform options like
strengthening and regulating the present mechanism of the
prevailing party-based appointment, establishing a roster to
promote transparency, additional institutional and appointed
authority involvement, and involving standing courts with
full time adjudicators who can exercise an appellate
mechanism which may directly address this issue.374
b) Code of Conduct
The general support received proved apparent the
necessity for the development of a code of conduct for
adjudicators, which prompted ICSID and UNICITRAL to
release a draft of the code during the thirty-eighth session of
WG-III.375 The purpose of such a reform is to address an
issue with the tribunals’ impartiality and independence and
promote integrity, efficiency and fairness. 376 Possible
implementation options involve the applicability of the code
of conduct on other relevant stakeholders including counsel
and experts—even the draft created by UNCITRAL and
ICSID limits the application to only adjudicators. 377 This
reform may prove to be efficient if it is backed by a strong
legal framework and enforcement mechanism.
3. Treaty Parties’ Involvement and
Control Mechanisms on Treaty
Interpretation
a) Enhancing Treaty Parties’ Control Over Their
Instruments

UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS):
Selection and Appointment of ISDS Tribunal Members, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.169 (Oct. 19, 2020) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.169].
375
See The Draft Code of Conduct (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://uncitral.un.org/en/codeofconduct.
376
Id.
377
Id. at arts. 1 and 2.
374
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This proposed reform option focuses on addressing
unjustified and inconsistent treaty interpretations discussed
during the thirty-sixth session of WG-III and encourages the
implementation of a more systematic treaty interpretation
mechanism.378 Such a reform is based on encouraging the
development and systematic use of treaty provisions by
unilateral and joint or multilateral interpretative declarations;
providing guidance to the tribunal regarding interpretation
of provisions, terms, and standards; ensuring binding treaty
interpretations; abidance of provisions by tribunals and
decisions makers; and establishing commissions or joint
committees on treaty interpretation. 379 Such a proposed
reform may bring consistency in treaty interpretation by
ISDS tribunals and serves to provide clarity to investors and
parties, both of which may eventually help to mitigate
disputes. This reform also promotes the usage of precise
language in treaties and the development of general rules of
treaty interpretation. 380 Possible options focus on the
reforms at the drafting stage of the treaty, after the treaty
conclusion and interpretative practices and involves
mechanisms like precision and clarity in investment treaty
drafting;
ad-hoc
authoritative
interpretation;
institutionalized authoritative interpretation; appellate
review; non-disputing party submission regarding treaty
interpretations during ISDS proceedings; and the release of
documents for treaty interpretation like travaux
préparatoires which may assist the tribunal to understand
the parties original intent and renvoi of certain interpretative
questions.381
b) Strengthening the Involvement of State
Authorities

U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.169, supra note 374, at 5.
Id.
380
Id.
381
Id.
378
379
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To address unjustified inconsistent treaty
interpretations along with other concerns of frivolous
investor claims, abuse of process, and increasing cost and
duration of ISDS, a possible reform option is to strengthen
the involvement and control of state authorities.382 Such a
mechanism may include establishing and strengthening the
framework for consideration of preliminary issues amongst
states which may include technical consultations; decisions
of respective state authorities; constituting state committee
joint review; state-state or appellate review; and the
establishment of a state-state body which can be approached
if settlement failure occurs at any given time at the technical
level.383 Implementation is possible as a stand-alone reform
option through various means such as prescribing certain
legal standards for qualification for inclusion in investment
treaties, or establishing a multilateral framework, or joint
state-state based multilateral appellate mechanism.384
4. Dispute Prevention and Mitigation
a) Strengthening
of
Dispute
Settlement
Mechanisms
Other
Than
Arbitration
(Ombudsman, Mediation)
To mitigate disputes between investors and host
states, maintain a harmonious relationship with investors,
and reduce the heavy cost and duration of ISDS, the WG-III
is focusing on possible alternative dispute resolution reform
options other than arbitration. 385 Possible reform options
may include implementing mediation, ombudsman facilities,
and promoting existing mechanisms similar to those
established during the United Nations Convention on
International Settlement Agreement (the Singapore
Convention).386
b) Exhaustion of Local Remedies
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.169, supra note 374, at 1.
Id.
384
Id.
385
Id.
386
Id.
382
383
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A significant reform option for developing
economies that is also mentioned in the Model BIT- India
(2015) is the pre-requirement of foreign investors to first
approach and exhaust local host state remedies before
invoking any ISDS mechanism provided under the
respective IIA. 387 Such a reform may also address the
growing concern of unequal treatment for host state
domestic investors where a foreign investor may bypass the
domestic legal remedy and invoke a treaty ISDS mechanism.
This reform can come to fruition through either binding
multilateral guidelines or incorporation under individual
IIAs.
c) Procedure to Address Frivolous Claims,
Including Early Dismissal
To check the filing of frivolous or unmeritorious
claims by investors, the WG-III is considering developing
guidelines containing checks and balances for claims,
establishing a preliminary review mechanism to pick out
frivolous claims, imposing costs for tribunals in ISDS, and
expediting processes. 388
d) Multiple Proceedings, Reflective Loss, and
Counterclaims by Respondent States
To address investor concerns of filing same claims
before multiple fora against the same host state or one
corporate structure with different proceedings and different
entities, the WG-III is considering introducing soft law
instruments to consolidate the proceedings, initiate the
exchange of information between tribunals, and stay the
proceedings. Additionally, the WG-III is also considering
applying the principles of res judicata, lis pendens, and
abuse of process. 389 Furthermore, in a situation where
unrelated multiple investors initiate proceedings against the
same state measure, the WG-III is considering consolidating
Id.
Id.
389
Id.
387
388
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such proceedings and establishing a commission to hear such
disputes. 390 Suggestions have also been submitted before
the WG-III to enable host states to file counterclaims before
the ISDS tribunal if an investor fails to perform its respective
IIA obligations.391
5. Cost Management and Related
Procedures
a) Expedited Procedures
One of the most significant concerns that affects
both states and investors are the lengthy time-consuming
proceedings of ISDS. To address the same, the WG-III is
considering proposals for reform for expedited procedures to
reduce time and cost of the proceedings which includes
strengthening and streamlining of the application of relevant
rules and procedure.392
b) Principles/Guidelines on Allocation of Cost and
Security for Cost
Another optional reform to address the cost and
duration of the ISDS is development of principles,
regulations or guidelines on allocation and sharing of cost,
security of cost, application of the loser-pays rule, and
providing guidance to tribunals.393
c) Other Streamlined Procedures and Tools to
Manage Costs
Other possible reforms include establishing a fixed
or acceptable budget of the proceedings, capping of fees of
tribunal members, and even the possibility of regulation of
counsel’s fee.394
d) Third Party Funding
The WG-III in its 37th session at New York heard
preliminary suggestions on possible reform options
UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166/Add.1 (July 30, 2019).
391
Id.
392
Id.
393
Id.
394
Id.
390
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concerning third party funding.395 Possible reform options
include reviewing the contract between the claimant and the
funder by counsels and arbitrators to better understand the
relationship, establishing legal aid cells to minimize the use
of third party funding, limiting or capping the return of the
funder, disclosing the details of third party funders, applying
security for cost for third party funders, and even banning
the same.396
To cover its broad mandate, the WG-III may
evaluate other possible reform options at a later stage other
than the aforesaid reform options. Due to the Covid-19
pandemic, the 39th session of the WG-III to be held in New
York was postponed and was held on the 5th through 9th of
October 2020 at Vienna.397
6. Submissions by Corporate Counsel
International Arbitration Group
(CCIAG) Before Working Group
III
Apart from the submissions received from the states,
the WG-III has also received submissions on possible reform
options from other stakeholders like various observer groups
and relevant organizations closely related to ISDS like the
Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group
(CCIAG).398
The CCIAG, an association of corporate counsels
representing international companies focusing on
international arbitration and dispute resolution and an
observer in the working group, offered its submissions to the
WG-III on 18th December 2019. 399 Focusing on the
interests of the investors, the submissions highlighted the
importance of FDI for global economic development and
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/970, supra note 354.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.166, supra note 323.
397
See Working Group III: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, supra
note 356.
398
Corp. Couns. Int’l Arb. Group, supra note 242.
399
Id.
395
396
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growth like creation of mass-employment, development of
infrastructure, development of human capital, development
of standards of living, transfer of technology etc., and further
pointed out to the need for the states to promote and facilitate
the environment conducive for foreign investment.400 The
CCIAG submissions highlighted the importance and global
recognition of an impartial third-party dispute settlement
mechanism as an effective ISDS mechanism essential for a
stable and transparent reinvestment regime and a key factor
for creating a positive investment climate for investors,
whereas, its absence was labeled as a contributory factor for
the creation of uncertainty which may dissuade investors,
especially the small and conservative investors and will thus
adversely affect the development plans of a state.401
Further in the submissions, the CCIAG also
evaluated and surveyed the current ISDS regime and its
essential features. Comparing the outcomes of the ISDS by
relying on the data provided by the UNCTAD, the CCIAG
pointed out that amongst the cases having outcomes, other
than the cases settled or discontinued, 36% of the cases have
been decided in favor of states and 29% has been decided in
favor of the Investor.402
Furthermore, CCIAG also pointed out to the
importance of party autonomy, particularly the equal
participation of the parties in the constitution of the tribunal
as a key element which is essential in creating balance in the
treatment amongst the state and investor in ISDS. 403 The
CCIAG, via its submission, further favored the current
generally acceptable mechanism of constitution of a tribunal
consisting of three arbitrators with one each appointed by
respective parties, and the chairperson of the tribunal being
appointed by the two party appointed arbitrators. 404
Id.
Id.
402
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
400
401

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2022

477

69

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 4
[Vol. 22: 409, 2022]

Standing at Crossroads
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

Furthermore, the CCIAG has submitted that the availability
of choice before the parties for selecting the appropriate
procedures and institutions creates confidence in both the
parties regarding the proceedings to be conducted in a fair
and impartial manner.405
CCIAG has further emphasized the present ISDS
mechanism to have suitable consistency, correctness, and
finality. 406
The submissions state that the present
mechanism of arbitration which doesn’t formally recognize
precedent, although tribunals often rely on the decisions
rendered previously by other tribunals, is suitable
considering that each tribunal is constituted to hear a
particular case and that the system itself was not designed to
have absolute consistency. 407 The CCIAG has further
pointed out that the focus has been on the correctness of the
award, which more likely results from appointing the best
suited arbitrators instead of confining itself to binding
precedents.408
Regarding the finality of the award, the CCIAG,
while accepting a possibility of errors and mistakes being
committed by tribunals, submitted that the present
mechanism of limited grounds of challenge and annulment
has been supported by the states and investors as alternative
mechanisms of appeal and a further reform broadening the
scope of review, although may result in some correct
decisions, would come at unacceptable costs and time.409
Thirdly, pointing out to the ICSID convention
providing essentially no ground for review and the New
York Convention providing limited grounds for review, the
CCIAG highlighted the significance of enforcement of
awards as a critical aspect of states’ and investors’
Id.
Id.
407
Id.
408
Id.
409
Id.
405
406
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confidence in the system. 410 The CCIAG submitted that
although investors support the need for reforms in the ISDS
regime concerning the slow and expensive procedures and
independence of arbitrators, they will not support reforms
that may adversely affect the equal rights of the parties,
balance between consistency, finality, and correctness or the
enforceability of the awards.411
Therefore, rejecting the reforms of establishment of
a Multilateral Investment Court and Appellate Mechanism,
the CCIAG has supported reforms such as establishment of
a Multilateral Advisory Centre while sharing concern
regarding the center acting as counsel in ISDS, a Code of
Conduct for arbitrators, while opposing a broad double
hatting prohibition and regulation of third-party funding
rather than prohibiting the same altogether.412
The CCIAG has further provided comments of
preliminary nature regarding proposed reform options which
are at an initial stage in WG-III.413 Such comments included
comments regarding reforms for improving arbitrator
selection by either maintaining a list or a database while also
focusing on the diversity of selection which the CCIAG has
welcomed.414 There were also comments regarding “prior
scrutiny of awards” by an independent body to which the
CCIAG has conveyed its concern regarding its feasibility
and instead has proposed to provide the disputing parties an
opportunity to review the award before it is finalized. 415
And there were reforms focusing on alternative dispute
resolution which although the CCIAG has welcomed but has
also emphasized on it being optional and reforms focusing

Id.
Id.
412
Id.
413
Id.
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Id.
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on expedited procedures and additional case management
tools to which the CCIAG has welcomed discussion.416
III.

Conclusion
An analysis of the expansion of IIAs and FDI in the
past century and the resultant inevitable rise of ISDS
establishes that their development has been dynamic and
inconsistent. Barring a few exceptions, the approach of the
global community towards the development of the
international investment regime has generally been to
address the short-term issues or issues-at-hand instead of
working on a long-term, coherent, permanent mechanism
that can withstand a significantly longer period of time. A
notable example is the failure to execute the ambitious
Havana Charter and the proposed establishment of ITO in
the Era of Institutional Conceptualization which had the
potential to provide a long-term, stable, coherent, permanent,
and institutionalized framework right in the initial years of
the present international investment regime. Even though,
the establishment of institutions in the later eras, like the
establishment of the WTO in 1994, which is considered
intellectually similar to the idea of ITO, 417 have made
significant impact on the global trade. Its development in
the later period itself clearly establishes the lack of a preemptive approach to act and address issues on part of the
global community. The reason for such myopic approach is
mainly that on a global stage, states have largely been
divided on their respective agendas and political motives.
Till the end of the Era of Contradiction, it was the debate
between Economic Marxism and Economic Liberalism,
which although today has faded away, but the difference of
opinion and mistrust originating from the neo-colonialist
perspective of many states and their respective stakeholders
Id.
See About WTO- The GATT Years: from Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Dec. 28, 2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm.
416
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remain as a main barrier for a unified approach towards
global trade. Thus, the future development and revaluation
of the international investment regime must necessarily
focus on the long-term goals of the global economy and
establish a permanent coherent mechanism to fulfill the
aspirations of all stakeholders in the long run.
Presently, in the midst of a pandemic fueling the
uncertainty, there is hardly any state that undermines the
significance of FDI for the economic development. Clearly,
for past few years, more states have preferred to regulate FDI
while maintaining its uninterrupted flow.418 To achieve this,
states have constantly been evolving their IIA regimes,
whereas the investors have been relying and constantly
exploring the novel jurisprudence of ISDS to evade such
regulatory measures that they do not find feasible or
beneficial for their investment.
To mitigate the drastic effect of the pandemic over
the economies, states have introduced many fiscal and other
economic measures to immediately stabilize the economies
like increased control and regulations over the supply chain,
introduction of flexible credit facilities by nationalized
banks, equity investment by states in crisis hit industries, or
even partial or full nationalization. 419 However such
measures come at a cost of increased state intervention in the
free market which may increase a socialistic pattern in the
longer run.
This may not be an easy option, as such measures,
which promote a socialistic pattern, although still acceptable
in developing and transactional economies, may not find
acceptability in developed economies, which are usually
characterized by minimum state control and may prefer to
resume back to the old ways as early as possible.
Furthermore, developing economies may lack the financial
UNCTAD, IPFSD, supra note 18, at 14. See UNCTAD, World 2020, supra
note 16.
419
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 88.
418
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means to efficiently and immediately implement such fiscal
packages and reforms at a scale that is necessary. Under
these circumstances, both the developing economies as well
as the developed ones will mainly have to rely on FDI to
boost up and re-stabilize their economies which may
consequently lead to another intensified competition to
attract FDI amongst states similar to that of the Era of
Expansion.
At the same time, states may also continue the trend
of formulation of restrictive investment policies experienced
in the latter part of Era of Revision caused by the insecurities
of states towards foreign investments on the grounds of
national security and protection from hostile takeovers of
strategic industries by foreign investors. Furthermore, states
may also prefer to regulate and restrict Foreign Investment
to focus toward self-sufficiency in terms of production,
especially for the critical supplies that has been highlighted
during this pandemic. Due to disruption in the GVC as a
result of the pandemic, major MNEs, which have faced
significant disruption may consider developing flexible and
multiple regional supply chains which may be beneficial for
the investors as well as align with the goals of the states.
Such a development may lead to major reevaluation of
policies which is likely to have a significant impact on the
present basic structure of international trade and may
drastically affect the FDI flow to Asian developing countries
which in recent years had emerged as global production
hubs.420
However, to compensate the possible loss of FDI
due to adoption of restrictive policies for protection of
strategic and critical industries or by possible reevaluation of
GVC, states may focus and channelize the FDI flow towards
other sectors and industries by adopting favorable polices
accordingly. Furthermore, in an attempt to move away from
the increasing socialistic pattern, certain states, majorly the
420

Id. at 38.
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developed states characterized by free market liberal
economies, may strategize their policies to assist them to
initiate disinvestments from the industries in which state
investments were made during the pandemic and at the same
time, channelize investments, including FDI, to re-stabilize
such industries.
This complex blend of restricting foreign
investments in certain critical and strategic industries while
increasingly depending on FDI flow to re-stabilize
economies, thereby intensifying the competition to attract
maximum FDI, may lead to complete reevaluation of the
global trade and investments policies that may have a
significant impact on its present basic structure even though
the chances of implementation of such changes cannot be
guaranteed.
Therefore, considering the possible
reevaluation of the basics of the international investment
regime combined with an intense competition amongst states
to attract maximum FDI to re-stabilize their respective
economies, the post pandemic era may have similarities to
both the era of infancy and the era of proliferation.
As a result, these developments may lead the states
to modernize and renegotiate the present IIAs and sign new
IIAs with a focus on regulating the FDI flow and adapt to the
new changes and policies to restabilize their economies. An
initial increase in socialistic pattern of state interference in
markets may accordingly lead to the introduction of
provisions for an increase in regulatory powers even though
many stakeholders and mainly the investors may not like it.
As seen in the model BIT of India, other states, especially
the developing states, may also follow in its footsteps and
soon introduce new regulatory or restrictive provisions in
future IIAs to regulate investments on the grounds of public
or national interest. Provisions such as exhaustion of
domestic remedies before the initiation of ISDS provided
under an IIA, limited grounds for initiating ISDS, limiting
the foreign investor’s protections like eliminating a
provision for FET or adoption of a traditional approach of
483
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CIL etc., may increasingly be adopted by states.
Furthermore, modern IIAs may also try to bring some
semblance of equality between its domestic and international
investors. Therefore, states may modify their previous
approach to attract maximum FDI adopted during the Era of
Expansion i.e., by offering abundant protections and instead
focus to attract FDI by other means such as a stable market
and potential for growth while maintaining a regulatory
control over it.
Due to uncertainty and possible reevaluation in the
post pandemic era, states may initially prefer a cautious
approach while negotiating or signing IIAs specifically BITs.
Although, with the return of certainty and stabilization in the
international investment regime and growth in the demand
of FDI, a surge in signing and renegotiation of modern IIAs
is certainly expected.
On a multilateral level, the development of IIA on
the global stage may not gain significant momentum for a
lack of unified approach amongst states due to the prevailing
differences in the political and economic objectives and
approach of each state. However, success is expected to be
achieved at regional level with the states having similar
economic objectives, development status, and approach. A
recent significant development is the signing of the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership signed by
Association of South East Asian Countries (ASEAN) on 15th
November 2020, which is one of the world’s largest FTA
considering the significant role of the signatory states in FDI
flow and international trade.421 Similarly, other significant
developments at regional level in IIAs may be expected in
regional unions like AFCFTA, European Union, NAFTA,
etc. having similar economic objectives, approach, and
development status.
Investment Trade Monitor–RCEP Agreement a Potential Boost for
Investment in Sustainable Post COVID Recovery, UNCTAD, No. 37 (Nov. 16,
2020), https://unctad.org/webflyer/global-investment-trend-monitor-no-37.
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Another projection having significant impact over
the international investment and trade regime is the
projection of a huge surge in ISDS.422 As per the available
data, as many as 31 new known ISDS’ have been initiated in
2020 and considering that many ISDS proceedings are not
disclosed in public and remain confidential, there is a high
probability of this number being greater.423 The main factors
contributing to such projection are the implementation of
restrictive policies by the states in view of the pandemic and
resultant significant disruptions in the FDI flow, along with
the consequential losses faced by the investors globally.
Desperate foreign investors facing huge losses, disruptions,
and increased costs resulting from the state’s lockdown
policies, investors may challenge them by citing the
protections afforded to them and obligations of the host state
under the respective IIAs. Such cases of ISDS may further
surge in the future if the states decide to continue the trend
of implementation of restrictive trade policies.
Considering these projected events and increasing
dissatisfaction towards the present ISDS regime, the states
may soon get impatient to bring stability, consistency, and
transparency in the ISDS regime. Perhaps the present ISDS
regime was not designed to accommodate such a huge
number of cases involving such complex questions of
interpretations of the law and involving massive monetary
claims having a significant impact on the economies of the
states. It is a big advantage that the requirement of reforms
in the ISDS regime was recognized well before the pandemic
and WG-III was formed.424 Clearly, with the rising number
of issues deepening the legitimacy crisis of the present ISDS
regime, the reforms have become inevitable, and the
pandemic has only focused on the urgency for crystallization
UNCTAD, World 2020, supra note 16, at 38.
UNCTAD, Navigator, supra note 12.
424
Working Group II Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, IPCC (2022),
https://www.ipcc.ch/working-group/wg2/.
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and implementations of the same. The WG-III, which is
instrumental in evaluating the reforms, had been following
its broad mandate in a time-bound manner until the
disruptions caused by the pandemic.425
In the wake of the projected surge in ISDS in the
post-pandemic era, the WG-III should, now more than ever,
focus on the urgent implementation of reforms for stability
and coherence of the ISDS regime which may also provide
a long-standing permanent solution. The fall in FDI flow
has already been raising eyebrows for the past few years and
the pandemic has further fueled uncertainty. Such reform
options should not only suit the states in fulfilling their
objectives, but should also be acceptable to foreign investors
who today are reluctant to invest due to fear of uncertainty
caused by the pandemic. While states may introduce
suitable investment policies in the future to attract FDI and
re-stabilize the economy, foreign investors would also prefer
the presence of an efficient dispute resolution mechanism
and evaluate the same before investing.
It is now clear that starting from the Era of
Expansion, a majority of the states globally are moving
towards a democratic and transparent form of government,
and undisputedly, democratic processes are more amenable
to establishment of institutions than resting responsibilities
to individuals. Therefore, states would prefer institutional
reforms as per the options discussed in WG-III. Such an
institution may include the establishment of a standing court
on investment disputes or the establishment of an Appellate
Authority.
However, investors may not prefer the
establishment of a standing court or appellate body citing
concerns over the lack of autonomy of the parties and fear of

UNCITRAL, Rep. of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Reform) on the Work of its Thirty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/1044
(2020).
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disputes being lagged in courts prolonging the resolution of
disputes.426
A permanent institutionalization of ISDS will also
address major concerns amongst the stakeholders regarding
the correctness of awards, consistency, appointment, and
qualification of judges, limiting the interference of domestic
judiciary, limiting/capping the cost, procedural stability,
transparency, etc.
A permanent standing court for
investment dispute settlement or an appellate body will bring
fairness and coherence compared to ad-hoc arbitration,
especially interpreting legal principles and applying
provisions of the same investment treaty in multiple disputes.
Such a reform option may readily be accepted by a majority
of the states considering the large number of cases already
initiated, especially in the Era of Expansion and Era of
Revision, and a far greater number of cases projected to be
initiated in post-pandemic era.
Although the WG-III is a state-led initiative, any
reform to which the investors have a legitimate concern
would not be implemented, especially after a strong
projection for an increased dependency on FDI flow in the
post-pandemic era. It must be ensured that the investors feel
confident with the dispute resolution mechanism. Apparent
from the submissions of CCIAG, it is highly unlikely that
the investors would favor the establishment of a permanent
standing court and would prefer to continue a dispute
resolution mechanism through Arbitration. Therefore,
considering the urgency of reform implementation, in light
of legitimacy concerns, transparency, inequality, and
coherence of the present ISDS mechanism along with the
state and investor considerations, it would be apt to establish
an appellate authority with fulltime judges having
jurisdiction over the awards passed in ITA. Such an
appellate mechanism may have limited power to review the
award in a time-bound manner, and should have powers to
426

Corp. Couns. Int’l Arb. Group, supra note 242.
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review, annul or modify awards on the grounds of any
procedural error, jurisdictional issue, any blatant error, an
allegation of any immoral or corrupt practice, conflict of any
basic notion of morality or justice, and most importantly to
review awards in terms of international legal principles and
questions of law and interpretation of provisions of the treaty.
An appellate institution will also create another higher level
of adjudicating authority over arbitral tribunals which can
effectively address the issue of legitimacy of the arbitral
proceedings.
Such a reform will also address the concern of the
investors by maintaining party autonomy in the arbitral
proceedings as well as address the issues of correctness,
fairness, predictability, and coherence in final adjudication
of disputes. Furthermore, it will also address the issue of
providing an opportunity to appeal/review/proceed for
annulment of the award that today is either not present in
ICSID or is present to limited effect under the New York
Convention, without causing any unnecessary or significant
delay.
Although reforms anticipating a surge in ISDS in
the post-pandemic era are urgent, implementing reform in
appellate authority remains challenging. For efficient
implementation, states will have to individually agree to
implement the reforms and effectively ratify and recognize
the same. Even if such reforms are ratified and incorporated
legally in law, a retrospective application of them would not
be possible to bring the arbitrations already initiated prior to
implementation of the reforms under its purview. Therefore,
other options that reforms within the present ISDS
mechanism of ITA and which can be parallelly implemented
with the establishment of an appellate authority should be
focused: like the development of a code of conduct,
mandatory disclosures for arbitrators, regulations regarding
double hatting, providing a database for qualified arbitrators,
transparent proceedings, etc.
488
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Another reform option that should be focused upon
and requires urgency is establishing an Advisory center as
suggested by the WG-III and has also been accepted by
CCIAG. This reform would help prevent the developing
states and specifically the LDC from being burdened from a
surge of ISDS soon from the foreign investors. Additionally,
an inclusive approach may also be necessary, requiring not
only a reform of the ISDS regime, but also of the substantive
rules of investment protection.427
Such reforms will also assist in the formation of a
permanent coherent mechanism for the longer run in the
resolution of ISDS. The issue that arises is the urgent and
planned implementation of reforms by carefully analyzing
and prioritizing their implementation with complete
cooperation by all the stakeholders.
Furthermore,
considering the prevalence of feelings of insecurity and
mistrust based on a neocolonialist perspective amongst the
majority of developing states, a reform based on
institutionalization while maintaining an equal participation
of the developing states will help gain trust and confidence.
Overall, a new perspective must be developed in the postpandemic era to reform and develop policy making in the
IIA regime and the ISDS regime. Coming years may lead to
uncertainty regarding FDI flows, but certainly, states will be
aiming and depending on an increased FDI flow for
economic stabilization and thereafter for future growth.
Instead of a short-term need-based legal mechanism
addressing only the immediate issues, the development and
implementation of a permanent long-term standing
mechanism should be focused, which can be addressed by
an institutional-based reform. Lastly and most importantly,
while considering any reform, it has to be borne in mind that
the general trend of an increasing outflow of FDI towards
developing states in recent years has made it clear that the
interest of developing states has to be the foremost priority
427
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and any reform, no matter how ambitious it may be, cannot
be implemented without their consent, support and
agreement.
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